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The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention: an Overlooked 
Opportunity to Change the Brown Collar Migration Paradigm 
 
Abstract 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (Migrant Worker Convention or Convention) is one of the United 
Nations’ nine core human rights treaties. The United States has neither signed nor ratified the 
treaty. Despite various reports and articles assessing potential ratification of the Convention by 
European and other countries, and an even more robust literature examining potential U.S. 
ratification of other UN core human rights treaties, there has been no examination of the 
potential for U.S. ratification of this Convention. 
 
The Convention is the most comprehensive global attempt to grapple with labor migration, a 
problem of dramatic international and domestic scope. The more than 24 million immigrants in 
the American workplace represent nearly 16% of the U.S. labor force. U.S. business continues to 
press for lower immigrant worker wage and housing standards, making the foreign-born an 
especially likely replacement for American workers in recessionary times.  
 
Ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention is desirable because, by promoting a vision of 
migrant workers as rights holders, the Convention would shift the American political climate 
toward policy reform. This would help to break through the current domestic political stalemate 
and build-up of undocumented immigrants. Ratifying the Migrant Worker Convention would 
also advance agendas important to both the right and the left, including increased national 
security through enhanced standing with the global south and a improved humanitarian situation 
for one of America’s most vulnerable groups. 
 
An analysis of the United States’ relationship to human rights treaties reveals that active 
negotiation, followed by delayed Executive signature and Senate consideration, are the norm. 
Seen within this historical context, the current lack of attention to the Convention appears typical 
of U.S. human rights treaty ratification practice, though the delay has been somewhat 
exacerbated by the controversial nature of immigration policy. The article proposes a typology 
for assessing treaty provisions, and uses this framework to analyze the Migrant Worker 
Convention’s potential impact on five politically sensitive U S. questions: legalization, border 
policies, expedited removal, family unification for legal workers, and worksite raids.  
 
World Trade Organization President Pascal Lamy recently noted that “There are world 
organisations for trade, health, the environment, telecoms, food. There are two black holes in 
world governance: finance…and migration.” U.S. engagement with the Migrant Worker 
Convention would help to address this situation and contribute to a rational global approach to 
low-paid labor migration. 
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low-income workers in America who are people of color. See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference 
for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 962 n. 1 (2006) 
(defining the “‘brown collar workplace’ as one in which newly arrived Latino immigrants are overrepresented in 
jobs or occupations. Because the newly arrived Latino can be documented or undocumented, it is less immigration 
status than the employer's perception of the worker as a newly arrived immigrant that marks the identity of the 
brown collar worker.”). 
2 Reuters, WTO Chief Urges Tough Global Financial Regulation, JAVNO, Nov. 8, 2008, http://www.javno.com/en-
economy/wto-chief-urges-tough-global-financial-regulation_201584. See also Alain Faujas and Frédéric Lemaître, 
Pascal Lamy: "Il faut une régulation contraignante:" Le patron de l'OMC plaide pour l'instauration d'un 
mécanisme de surveillance et de sanctions de la finance mondiale, LE MONDE, November 9, 2008. 
3 Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire, Migration, Human Rights and the United Nations: An Investigation into 
the Obstacles to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers’ Right, 24 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
241, 244 (2006). 
4 Associate Professor of Law and Director, Farmworker Legal Aid Clinic, Villanova University School of Law. I am 
very grateful to my Villanova colleagues, to the participants in the Marquette Law School faculty exchange 
workshop, and to Tucker Culbertson, Nancy Ehrenreich, Sarah Paoletti, Michele Pistone, and Carlos Vazquez for 
their helpful comments on this article, as well as to Villanova School of Law for its writing support. I thank the 
Villanova Law and University of Pennsylvania Law librarians for their excellent assistance. While any errors are my 
own, I also thank Research Assistants Kristin Waller, Amarachi Utah, Kim Gasparon, Sarah Lichter, Ellen 
Cantillon, Eric Eilerman, Raimundo Guerra and Ron Hochbaum for their excellent research assistance. I also thank 
my family members for their unswerving love and support.  
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I. Introduction 
The United States is re-ordering its foreign policy priorities. The closing of Guantanamo,5 
planned withdrawal from Iraq,6 President Obama’s pledge to ratify several international treaties 
such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),7 and 
                                                
5 See Frank Jordans, UN Expert Wants Gitmo Probe Before Camp Closes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hl-l62Szmf-WOjAMmO8fZMi4A7AAD96RB4H01. 
6 See Peter Baker, With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/washington/28troops.html. 
7 See Bob Egelko, Obama Pledge on Treaties a Complex Undertaking, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 2008, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/01/MNK414CTFB.DTL&type=printable. President 
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 4 
his statements on the urgency of poverty alleviation in the global south8 all demonstrate that the 
United States is beginning an era of heightened international cooperation and leadership with 
regard to humanitarian issues. On the domestic policy side, the administration has also taken 
steps that indicate a focus on improving conditions in the American workplace and improving 
the situation of low-income immigrants. With these goals fore-grounded for the first time in 
recent political history, the United States should take steps to ratify the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Signing 
the Migrant Worker Convention would advance the U.S. government’s humanitarian goals, but 
the United States has never seriously considered the Migrant Worker Convention. This article 
aims to begin the discussion. 
 
The Article argues that the United States should look to international standards with regard to the 
controversial political issue of labor migration.9 Specifically, the Article posits that the U.N. 
Migrant Worker Convention, dismissed by this and other migrant-receiving countries for nearly 
two decades as a political non-starter, provides a rational approach to labor migration that 
deserves meaningful examination by the United States. The Article further asserts that even the 
most preliminary discussion about the Convention would benefit this country, because it would 
inject into domestic debates the notion that immigrant workers, including unauthorized workers, 
are subjects of human rights protection. 
 
The United States needs to examine international models because Americans and their leadership 
are fundamentally at odds about labor migration. While all sides agree that illegal immigration is 
undesirable, the country is deeply divided on the solution. The groups that disfavor even the 
current levels of legal immigration, let alone regularization of undocumented immigrants, 
typically advocate for tighter visa quotas, stricter border controls, and more aggressive 
deportation measures. On the other hand, most immigrants’ rights advocates seek legalization 
and better workplace protections for all low-wage workers, including those who are unauthorized 
immigrants. Moderates of both wings favor temporary worker programs as a way to control 
migration, though they differ over the optimal size and conditions of entry and work of the 
temporary workforce. However, compromise has proved impossible for more than six years of 
serious, high-level policy debate and bipartisan effort. Approval of legalization as a solution to 
the exponentially increasing undocumented population is expanding among policymakers, even 
                                                                                                                                                       
Obama indicated during the campaign his interest in re-engaging the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, and also indicated support for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See id. The 
CEDAW can be found at Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 
by General Assembly on 18 December, 1979, GA Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193; in force 3 
September, 1981 [hereinafter CEDAW].  
8 See Bob Unruh, Obama’s $845 Billion U.N. Plan Forwarded to U.S. Senate Floor: ‘Global Poverty Act’ to Cost 
Each Citizen $2,500 or More, WORLDNETDAILY.COM, July 25, 2008, 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?pageId=70308. 
9 See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and Historic Perspectives on the 
AgJobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417, passim (2005) (describing the controversial and failed attempt to 
enact “AgJobs,” a targeted, compromise immigration legalization measure that had been negotiated by the 
agricultural industry, unions, and immigrants’ and worker rights organizations); see also Kevin R. Johnson & Bill 
Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, passim (2007) (describing public demonstrations regarding proposed U.S. immigration 
legislation). [Why are you citing these sources in your roadmap?] 
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as the American public expresses an increased preference for enforcement-focused solutions. 
The result is a series of superficial policy shifts that fail to address the underlying issues, 
producing an immigration regime that seems to be rudderless, offering only unenforceable laws 
to address vocal public concern, widespread human suffering, and damage to America’s 
credibility with the international community. 
 
Similar dynamics are playing out around the world. There are large numbers of brown collar 
immigrant workers, many of them unauthorized, in other wealthy regions and countries, such as 
Europe,10 Canada11 and Australia,12 and allegations of insupportable working conditions arise 
from each of these different country contexts.13 In 1949 and again in 1975, the International 
Labour Organization issued Conventions for the protection of migrant workers.14 As compared 
with other ILO treaties, the two migrant worker Conventions were ignored. The eight 
“fundamental” ILO treaties, dealing with freedom of association, non-discrimination in the 
workplace, forced labor, and child labor, have on average 163 ratifications.15 Meanwhile, the 
                                                
10 See Melanie Kiehl and Heinz Werner, The Labour Market Situation of EU and of Third Country Nationals in the 
European Union, ERIC # ED429228, 
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_Se
archValue_0=ED429228&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED429228 (giving a figure of 7.8 million 
non-nationals in the EU work force as of 1995, 3 million of them Europeans working outside their home countries); 
European Parliament, MEPs adopt legislative resolution to crackdown on employers of illegal immigrants, available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20090202FCS47946&language=EN (stating that “between 4.5 and 8 million illegal immigrants 
work in the construction, farming, hotel and other sectors in the EU.”); 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2002/12/inbrief/be0212301n.htm; European Platform for Migrant Workers’ 
Rights, The Rights of Migrant Workers in the European Union: 2006 Shadow Reports for Estonia, France, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom 16 (2006) (noting the difficulty of collecting data on migrant workers in Europe), available 
at http://www.december18.net/web/docpapers/doc5097.pdf. 
11 See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION [UNESCO], Identification of the 
Obstacles to the Ratification of the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families: The Canadian Case, at 4, UNESCO Doc. SHS/2006/MC/9 (Aug. 
2006) (prepared by Victor Piché et al.), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001473/147310E.pdf 
[hereinafter Canadian Assessment of the Treaty]; see also Press Release, International Labour Organization [ILO], 
As Migrant Ranks Swell, Temporary Guest Workers Increasingly Replacing Immigrants Private Employment 
Agencies Send Millions Overseas to Work, ILO/97/9 (Apr. 18, 1997), 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Press_releases/lang--
en/WCMS_008048/index.htm. 
12 See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION UPDATE 2007-
2008 (2008), available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/immigration-
update/update_june08.pdf. 
13 See Immigrants Tell Panel of Poor Working Conditions, 
http://immigrantsinusa.blogspot.com/2006/04/immigrants-tell-panel-of-poor-working.html (Apr. 3, 2006, 13:18 
EST). 
14 See Convention Concerning Migration for Employment, adopted July 1, 1949, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C097; Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and 
the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, adopted June 24, 1975, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C143 [hereinafter ILO 143].  
15 See Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, adopted July 9, 
1948, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087 (having 149 ratifications); Convention 
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, adopted July 1, 
1949, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C098 (having 159 ratifications); Convention 
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ILO’s 1949 migrant worker convention, ILO 97, has attracted only 48 ratifications, and the 1975 
convention, ILO 143, has garnered only 23.16 
 
In 1979, the Mexican and Moroccan governments proposed that the United Nations promulgate a 
migrant worker rights treaty, feeling that a UN Convention would attract more countries of 
employment.17 After ten years of negotiation that involved all regions of the world,18 the UN 
promulgated the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (the Migrant Worker Convention). What resulted is the 
world’s only comprehensive document for the protection of migrant workers.19 Among the 
treaty’s major accomplishments are: 1) it provides groundbreaking protection for documented 
labor migrants; 2) it establishes equality of protection in the workplace for immigrant workers;20 
and 3) it repeats and underscores existing human rights protection for unauthorized workers, by 
guaranteeing fundamental rights for all migrant workers (including unauthorized immigrants),21 
for example the right not to be tortured22 or enslaved.23 Importantly for its ratification prospects, 
the treaty establishes these human rights principles without dictating any particular immigration 
policy framework.24 
                                                                                                                                                       
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, adopted June 28, 1930, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C029 (having 173 ratifications); Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, adopted 
June 25, 1957, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C105 (having 169 ratifications); Convention 
Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, adopted June 29, 1951, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C100 (having 166 ratifications); Convention Concerning 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, adopted June 25, 1958, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C111 (having 168 ratifications); Convention Concerning Minimum Age 
for Admission to Employment, adopted June 26, 1973, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C138 (having 151 ratifications); Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, adopted June 17, 1999, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C182 (having 169 ratifications). 
16 See Convention Concerning Migration for Employment, adopted July 1, 1949, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C097; Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and 
the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, adopted June 24, 1975, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C143. [Again you need International Treaty Sources for all these 
conventions. Additionally, I gave the adoption date. Bluebook, however, prefers the signing date if available. The 
ILO website only gives the adoption and coming into force dates.]  
17 Two major reasons for a UN Convention were: 1) UN Conventions allow the flexibility of restrictions on 
ratification, while ILO Conventions do not; and 2) the ILO, with its tri-partite Government-Employer-Union 
structure was viewed with more suspicion by the West than the UN monitoring process. See Pécoud & Guchteneire, 
supra note 3, at 246.  
18 See Lisa S. Bosniak, Human Rights, State Sovereignty And The Protection Of Undocumented Migrants Under the 
International Migrant Workers’ Convention, in Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and 
International Perspectives, 311, 312 (Barbara Bogusz, Ryszard Cholewinski, Adam Cygan and Erika Szyszczak 
eds., 2004). 
19 See Pécoud & Guchteneire, supra note 3, at 241. 
20 See Convention Concerning the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
ICMW, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into 
force 1 July 2003, art. 25 available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/m_mwctoc.htm [hereinafter UN Migrant 
Worker Convention]. 
21 See id.  
22 See id. at  
23 See id. 
24 See Pécoud & Guchteneire, supra note 3, at 246. 
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The Convention was opened for signature in 1990.25 To the surprise of the negotiators,26 the 
Convention was not widely ratified. After initially participating in negotiating the Convention,27 
the major migrant-receiving countries set it aside, and it languished for a record thirteen years28 
before accruing the twenty ratifications it needed to go into force.29 The ratification then picked 
up speed. Mary Robinson, former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, concentrated 
                                                
25 See  Convention Concerning the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
supra note 20. 
26 See Pécoud & Guchteneire, supra note 3, at 242. 
27 The following is a non-exclusive list of industrialized countries that were active participants in the negotiations, 
drawn from the record of proceedings at different stages of the process: Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States. See [Insert Issuing Body], Report of 
the Economic and Social Council, Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human Rights and Dignity of 
all Migrant Workers: Report of the Open Working Group, A/C.3/35/13 (Nov. 25, 1980) [hereinafter November 1980 
Working Group Report] (Annex VI (written proposal of United States); para. 9 (statement of Italy); Report of the 
Economic and Social Council, Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human Rights and Dignity of all 
Migrant Workers: Report of the Open-Ended Working Group, A/C.3/36/10 (Nov. 23, 1981) [hereinafter November 
1981 Working Group Report] (para. 31 (statement of Greece, Italy and Spain), para. 44 (statement of the 
Netherlands), para. 53 (statement of Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden); Report of the Economic and Social 
Council, Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human Rights and Dignity of all Migrant Workers: 
Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Elaboration of an International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families on its intersessional meetings from 10 to 21 May 1982, 
A/C.3/37/1 (June 11, 1982) [hereinafter June 1982 Working Group Report] (para. 23 (statement of Finland, France, 
Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden, para. 24 (statement of the Netherlands), and para. 93 (statement of 
Belgium)); Report of the Economic and Social Council, Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human 
Rights and Dignity of all Migrant Workers: Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Elaboration of an 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, A/C.3/37/7 
(Nov. 19, 1982) [hereinafter November 1982 Working Group Report] (para. 22 (statement of Great Britain), and 
para. 43 (statement of Malaysia)). Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the open-ended Working 
Group on the Elaboration of an International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Their Families, A/C.3/40/1 (June 20, 1985) [hereinafter June 1985 Working Group Report] (paras. 19-22 (statement 
of the Federal Republic of Germany), paras. 25-27 (Australia), paras. 28-29 (statement of Norway), paras. 30-31 
(statement of Denmark), para. 28 (statement of Greece), paras. 50-51 (statement of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics), paras. 57-58 (statement of Italy), paras. 59-60 (statement of France), paras. 61-62 (statement of the 
United States), para. 68 (statement of the Netherlands), and para. 89 (statement of Finland and Sweden); Report of 
the Economic and Social Council, Report of the open-ended Working Group on the Drafting of an International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, A/C.3/45/1 (June 21, 1990) 
[hereinafter June 1990 Working Group Report] (para. 14 (statement of Portugal), para. 15 (statement of the Federal 
Republic of Germany), para, 16 (statements of France and the Netherlands), para. 17 (statements of Finland and 
Japan), para. 18 (statements of Italy and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), and para. 19 (statements of 
France, the Netherlands and the United States)). See also Luca Bicocchi, Rights of All Migrant Workers (Part III of 
the Convention) Travaux Préparatoires , 1 & n. 6 ( available at 
<www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/draftinghistoryrev1.doc> [hereinafter Bicocchi, Travaux]. 
28 See Pécoud & Guchteneire, supra note 3, at 242. 
29 See United Nations Treaty Collection, STATUS AS AT: 18-03-2009 06:04:59 EDT, Chapter IV, Human Rights: 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families: 
New York, 18 December 1990,  available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=138&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited March 18, 
2009) [hereinafter ICMW Ratification Record]; see also UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, at Art. 87, 
Clause 1. 
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resources on a ratification campaign during and in the years since her time with the U.N.,30 and 
as a result the treaty now has 30 signatories and 41 parties.31 
 
None of the current parties to the treaty is considered to be a major country of employment, 
although parties Mexico, Morocco and Turkey do host significant migrant worker populations. 
There is some movement toward ratification in the industrialized world. The European 
Parliament,32 the European Economic and Social Committee,33 and the Organization of 
American States34 have all favorably reported on the Migrant Worker Convention and called on 
the countries in those regions to ratify it. However, there are obstacles to immediate ratification 
by countries of employment, including prominently the “fear to be among the first”35 and 
domestic anti-immigrant sentiment.36 Ironically, both of these obstacles can also be seen as 
reasons why migrant workers need supplementary protection. Even as the Convention slowly 
accrues country of origin ratifications, many regions and countries of employment are 
undertaking pre-ratification studies and assessments of the treaty vis-à-vis domestic law, 
including Canada,37 Europe,38 Japan,39 and New Zealand.40 
                                                
30 See Press Release, December 18: International Advocacy and Resource Centre on the Human Rights of Migrant 
Workers, On International Migrants Day, NGOs Call for Ratification of UN Migrant Workers’ Convention (Dec. 18, 
2004),  http://www.december18.net/web/docpapers/doc2162.doc (urging Ireland to ratify the Migrant Worker 
Convention); Press Release, December 18: International Advocacy and Resource Centre on the Human Rights of 
Migrant Workers, Mary Robinson Joins Global Radio Marathon to Celebrate International Migrant’s Day on 18th 
December (Dec. 11, 2006) http://www.december18.net/web/docpapers/doc4741.doc; See Sean O’Driscoll, Mary 
Robinson, Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Addressed the Rethinking Global Immigration 
Conference in New York, IRISH EXAMINER, May 27, 2006, http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=9634&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (explaining Robinson criticized U.S. for not 
ratifying U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and Migrant Worker Convention); Press Release, Migrant 
Rights International, Former UN Human Rights Head Mary Robinson to Governments on Migration and 
Development: Do Not Forget Human Rights (Sept. 15, 2006),  
http://migrantsrightsinternational.blogspot.com/2006_09_01_archive.html (describing Robinson’s position that 
“there is a need to link migration to development without sacrificing human rights”). 
31 See ICMW Ratification Record, supra note 29. 
32 See EC, Resolution on the EU’s rights, priorities and recommendations for the 58th Session of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights in Geneva (17 March to 25 April 2003), [2003] document no. P5-TA 0034, sitting of Thursday, 30 
January 2003, O.J. C 39/E 70 (13 February 2004) at point 5, available at 
http://europe.edint/eurlx/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/ce03920040213en00700073.pdf.  
33 European Economic and Social Committee, SOC/173, Opinion No. 960 of 30 June 2004, available at 
http://eescopinions.esc.eu.int/EESCopinionDocument.aspx?identifier=ces\soc\soc173\ces9602004_ac.doc&languag
e=EN.  
34 Organization of American States, General Assembly, 32nd Sess., The Human Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Their Families, OR OEA/Sen./AG/Res. 1898 (XXXII-O/02) (2002), available at 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://scm.oas.org/Reference/english/english.htm. 
35 Pécoud & Guchteneire, supra note 3, at 258-59. 
36 See id. at 259-61. 
37 See Canadian Assessment of the Treaty, supra note 11. 
38 See UNESCO, The Migrant Workers Convention in Europe: Obstacles to the Ratification of the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families:  EU/EEA 
Perspectives, SHS-2007/WS/7 – CLD 1195.7 (2007) (prepared by Euan MacDonald and Ryszard Cholewinski) 
[hereinafter European Assessment of the Treaty]. 
39 See UNESCO, Identification of the Obstacles to the Signing and Ratification of the UN Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers: The Asia-Pacific Perspective, SHS/2003/MC/1 REV (Oct. 2003) 
(prepared by Nicola Piper and Robyn Iredale) available at 
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The goal of this Article is to initiate another of these long-deferred discussions by analyzing the 
possibility of ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention by the United States. Part II of the 
Article argues that the United States has not yet assessed the Migrant Worker Convention in a 
serious way. This part also points out that the United States’ delay in engaging the Convention is 
typical in light of this country’s past human rights treaty ratification processes. The section 
provides an overview of the analytical and political work that is likely to be involved in such an 
assessment, based on this country’s past human rights treaty ratification processes. The section 
flags the difficult question of restrictions on ratification, noting that the United States is likely to 
heavily restrict ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention, just as it has in ratifying previous 
human rights treaty. Part III of the Article proposes a typology of treaty comparisons drawn from 
the United States’ past human rights treaty ratification experience, providing an analytical 
framework for American policymakers to assess the Convention vis-à-vis U.S. law. Arguing that 
a significant portion of the Convention contains standards that the United States has already 
ratified, Part III also lays out the substantive concerns raised by the United States during the 
treaty negotiations, and points out that most of the passages that were objectionable at the time 
were or have since become part of U.S. law. Part III then analyzes the Convention’s likely 
interplay with five sensitive U.S. migration and migrant worker policies. Part IV of the Article 
addresses arguments for and against ratification, concluding that signature and ratification of the 
Convention are advisable, as it would shift the political climate toward policy reform, advance 
foreign policy goals, educate U.S. officials on best practices, and benefit civil society. 
 
II. Brushing the Dust off the U.N. Migrant Worker Convention 
 
Many industrialized countries of employment, or migrant-receiving countries, including the 
United States, participated actively in the Migrant Worker Convention’s ten-year drafting 
process.41 Eighteen years later, not one of these countries has signed or ratified the Convention.42 
During those 18 years, the United States has ratified six other human rights treaties,43 but has not 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139528E.pdf [hereinafter Asia Assessment of the Treaty]. 
40 See id. at 39-42. 
41 For a non-exclusive list of industrialized countries that were active participants in the negotiations, drawn from 
the record of proceedings at different stages of the process, see supra note 27. 
42 See ICMW Ratification Record, supra note 29. Note that the USSR, listed in the prior footnote as a migrant-
receiving participant in the negotiations, has since dissolved, but its major successor nation, Russia, has not ratified 
the ICMW. See id. 
43 The United States has ratified the following six international human rights treaties since 1990: 1) the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1992, see United Nations Treaty Collection, STATUS AS AT: 
18-03-2009 06:04:59 EDT: CHAPTER IV: HUMAN RIGHTS: 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, at 3, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=322&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter ICCPR 
Ratification Record]; 2) the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) in 1994, see United Nations Treaty Collection, STATUS AS AT: 18-03-2009 06:04:59 EDT: CHAPTER 
IV: HUMAN RIGHTS: 2. International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, New 
York, 7 March 1966, at 3, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=319&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter CERD 
Ratification Record]; 3) the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
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seriously examined the Migrant Worker Convention. The following section lays out the ten steps 
typically involved when the United States engages in multilateral treaty-making United States, 
and argues that the Migrant Worker Convention has passed through few states of the process. 
The section further argues that many features of the Migrant Worker Convention’s progress 
toward U.S. ratification fit the pattern of this country’s previous human rights treaty ratification 
processes. 
 
A. The Migrant Worker Convention Has Passed through Few Stages of the U.S. Multilateral 
Treaty-Making Process 
 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution sets forth the basic requirements of the U.S. ratification 
process: “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur...”44 The framers’ intent 
was for the Senate to be closely involved in all stages of the treaty-making process. 45 However, 
the role of the Senate in the treaty-making process changed as the Senate grew and the number of 
international agreements became too great to make close involvement in negotiation 
practicable.46 According to the Congressional Research Service’s Handbook on the treaty-
making process, “the Senate role [in treaty formation] now is primarily to pass judgment on 
whether completed treaties should be ratified by the United States. The Senate’s advice and 
consent is asked on the question of Presidential ratification.”47  
 
The Handbook describes modern multilateral treaty-making48 as a ten-step process: 1) Secretary 
                                                                                                                                                       
Punishment in 1994, see United Nations Treaty Collection, STATUS AS AT: 18-03-2009 06:04:59 EDT: 
CHAPTER IV: HUMAN RIGHTS: 9. Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, New York, 10 December 1984, at 3, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=129&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter CAT 
Ratification Record]; 4) the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour in 1999, see Convention No. C182, at 9, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C182; 5) the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict in 2002, see United Nations Treaty Collection, STATUS AS AT: 18-03-2009 06:04:59 
EDT: CHAPTER IV: HUMAN RIGHTS: 11.b. the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed conflict, New York, 25 May 2000, at 3, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=135&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter CRC Child 
Soldier Protocol Ratification Record]; and 6) the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography in 2002, see United Nations Treaty Collection, 
STATUS AS AT: 18-03-2009 06:04:59 EDT: CHAPTER IV: HUMAN RIGHTS: 11.c. the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, New York, 
25 May 2000, at 3, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=136&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter CRC Child 
Abuse Protocol Ratification Record].  
44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
45 See S. REP. 106-71, at 2-3 (2001). 
46 See id. 
47 Id. at 3. 
48 Different processes apply to Executive Agreements and bi-lateral treaties. See id. at 21-26 (describing executive 
agreements, which are international agreements that executive branch enters into without submitting them to Senate 
as treaties); see also id. at 10 (including flow chart showing formation process of executive agreement); Id. at 8-9 
(containing flow chart showing formation of bi-lateral treaty). 
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of State authorizes negotiation; 2) U.S. representative negotiates with representatives of other 
country or countries; 3) negotiators agree on terms and, upon authorization of the Secretary of 
State, the U.S. representative signs the treaty; 4) the President may submit treaty to Senate; 5) the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers the treaty and decides whether to report it 
favorably to the Senate; 6) the whole Senate may consider the treaty, and a 2/3 majority may 
vote to approve a resolution of ratification.49 The Senate may “approve it as written, approve it 
with conditions, reject and return it, or prevent its entry into force by withholding approval;”50 7) 
after renegotiating any terms put into question by the ratification resolution, the President may 
sign the instrument of ratification; 8) the President may deposit the instrument of ratification 
with the designated depository, whereupon 9) the treaty enters into force according to its terms, 
and thereby becomes binding under international law; and 10) the President proclaims entry into 
force, providing domestic notification of the new law.51  
 
At the present juncture, the Migrant Worker Convention has passed through only steps one and 
two of the process the Senate’s Handbook describes. The fact that the Migrant Worker 
Convention is stalled at step three is unsurprising. The particular political history of U.S. human 
rights treaty-making has created some relatively predictable wrinkles in the treaty-making 
paradigm that are already manifesting themselves in the case of the Migrant Worker Convention. 
A. Steps One and Two: Active Executive Engagement in Negotiation 
Professor Louis Henkin invoked the flying buttress as a metaphor of the United States’ 
relationship to the international human rights treaty regime – in the words of Professor Margaret 
McGuinness, “the U.S. supports the cathedral of international human rights from the outside, 
rather than as a pillar from within the system.”52 One reason for this image is that the United 
States historically participates actively in human rights treaty development, but does not readily 
join human rights treaties as states parties subject to international monitoring. Thus, the fact that 
the United States was active in negotiating the Migrant Worker Convention does not make this 
particular treaty unique. Indeed, from the earliest days of the international human rights regime, 
the United States has been an active participant in creating human rights standards. Through its 
representative Eleanor Roosevelt, the United States was instrumental in steering the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to successful completion.53 Mrs. Roosevelt also worked 
to ensure that the UDHR was enshrined in a treaty that could become binding international law 
through individual country ratifications.54 Subsequently the United States continued to play an 
active role in negotiating major human rights treaties.55 
                                                
49 See id. at 8-9 (referring to flow chart showing the formation of a multi-lateral treaty). 
50 Id. at 3. 
51 See id. at 8-9. 
52 Margaret E. McGuinness, Sanchez-Llamas, American Human Rights Exceptionalism and the VCCR Norm Portal, 
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 47, 52 (2007).  
53 NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 66-68 
(1990) [hereinafter KAUFMAN]. 
54 Id. at 68 
55 See, e.g., LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN X (1993); SHARON DETRICK, THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" 116, 117, 151 & 
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In fact, past U.S. executives carried out negotiations on human rights treaties over the active 
objections of the Senate and of established domestic actors. For example, the United States was 
heavily involved in negotiating the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights despite domestic outrage over the socialist nature of the rights it contained.56 U.S. 
participation in negotiations leading to the International Criminal Court similarly suffered from 
the active opposition of a key domestic actor, the Department of Defense.57 Negotiation of the 
Migrant Worker Convention appears to have taken place against a somewhat less controversial 
domestic backdrop, and the United States engaged extensively in the negotiating the treaty. A 
detailed analysis of the U.S. role in negotiation of the Convention lies beyond the Scope of the 
present article, but a brief description is provided here to support this paper’s assertion that the 
United States was deeply and genuinely involved in creation of the treaty. 
 
In 1979, the UN General Assembly created a Working Group to draft a convention to protect 
migrant workers and their families.58 Although the United States abstained from this vote,59 the 
formal reports of the Working Group, which provide summaries of the various delegations’ 
positions and conclusions, reflect literally hundreds of substantive and detailed interventions by 
the United States over the ten years of negotiations.60 On many occasions, the United States was 
instrumental in breaking impasses by proposing compromise language, participating in informal 
consultations,61 and registering its underlying understanding of particular provisions.62 
 
Notwithstanding this active involvement in the negotiations, at several junctures the United 
                                                                                                                                                       
passim (1992) (documenting the United States’ active participation in negotiating the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child). 
56 See KAUFMAN, supra note 53, at 69-93. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can 
be found at Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
57 See Joe Stork, International Criminal Court, 3 FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS 1, 1-3 (1998). 
58 See G.A. Res. 34/172, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/172 (Dec. 17, 1979). 
59 See UNBISNET, Voting Record Search for G.A. Res. 34/172, available at 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1237PB86C4849.643618&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=
50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=.VM&term=34%2F172&matchopt=0%7C0&oper=and&aspect=
power&index=.VW&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper=and&index=.AD&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper=and&in
dex=BIB&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=&x
=19&y=11#focus (searched January 5, 2009). 
60 See, e.g., November 1980 Working Group Report, supra note 27, Working Paper Presented by the United States of 
America (presenting eleven considerations for drafting the convention); November 1981 Working Group Report, 
supra note 27, paras. 6, 17, 26, 29-30, 33, 50, 55, 62, 64, 67, 70, 73-74,76; Report of the Economic and Social 
Council, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Drafting of an International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, A/C.3/41/3 paras. 38, 55-56, 59, 62, 66, 71, 80, 
142, 14, 162, 179, 194, 199, 209, 222, 230 (Oct. 10, 1986) [hereinafter October 1986 Working Group Report]. 
61 See, e.g., November 1981 Working Group Report, supra note 27, para. 17 (U.S. Representative agreed to hold an 
“informal consultation” with the representatives of Jamaica and Morocco “to find a compromise text” on preambular 
language). 
62 See, e.g., June 1990 Working Group Report, supra note 27, para. 34 (statement of the United States, stating that 
the U.S. delegation “had not wished to block consensus on [the provisions relating to social security], but clarified 
for the record that, in her delegation’s view, the only ‘appropriate measures’ a State could take to try to avoid denial 
of social security rights or duplication of payments would be to endeavor to conclude bilateral or multilateral 
agreements aimed at achieving that goal.”). 
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States expressed ambivalence about the Convention. In 1986, the U.S. working group 
representative stated that a reservation to Convention article 16.9 would likely be registered “if 
and when the present Convention is submitted to the Senate.”63 In 1987, the U.S. representative 
“stated that his Government was not yet convinced of the need for a convention on the human 
rights of migrant workers, and that if such a need were demonstrated, such a convention should 
be negotiated in [the] ILO.”64  
 
At the same time, the negotiation history also reveals a United States that was committed to the 
goals of the Convention. For example, the United States introduced and successfully advocated 
for Convention coverage of foreign investors, thereby creating a new category of protection 
under the treaty.65 The United States also sought successfully to broaden the Convention’s 
protection of migrants’ associational rights.66 Finally, in the June 1989 working group session, 
the first in which the George Bush administration participated, the U.S. representative made a 
statement that at least one other participant took to be a significant change of position by the 
United States. In that statement, the U.S. representative urged that the working group take the 
time to iron out the final details of the convention before submitting it to the General 
Assembly.67 In his remarks, the U.S. representative stated that “[m]y delegation is pleased that 
the Working Group has made substantial progress this session towards completing the 
Convention.”68 Several other representatives immediately associated themselves with this 
intervention.69 According to the reported reaction of the Moroccan representative, “the statement 
by the United States was very useful, especially since in the Third Committee the United States 
delegation had always voted against the resolution of the draft Convention that the Working 
Group was in the process of drafting.”70  
 
Working Group participant and Vice-Chairman Juhani Lönnroth has observed that, during the 
negotiations, “[t]here was a rather widespread belief that the United States would not sign and 
ratify the Convention in the immediate future. But it was equally evident that the United States 
wished to make the draft meet high legal standards and to make its content as close to its 
interests as possible in order to create prerequisites for an eventual ratification at some later 
stage.”71 Whether the United States’ positive statements about the Convention indeed reflected a 
                                                
63 October 1986 Working Group Report, supra note 60, para. 222 (emphasis added). 
64 Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Drafting of an 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, A/C.3/42/1 
para. 326 (June 22, 1987) [hereinafter June 1987 Working Group Report]. 
65 See Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Drafting of an 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, A/C.3/40/6 
paras. 104-111 (Oct. 15, 1985) [hereinafter October 1985 Working Group Report]. 
66 See June 1987 Working Group Report, supra note 64, para. 236. 
67 Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Drafting of an 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, A/C.3/44/1 
para. 307 (June 19, 1989) [hereinafter June 1989 Working Group Report]. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at paras. 308 (Norway); see also id. at 309 (Netherlands, Finland, France, Italy, Japan and Sweden).  
70 See id. at para. 311. 
71 Juhani Lönnroth, The International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families in the Context of International Migration Policies: An Analysis of Ten Years of Negotiation, XXV INT’L 
MIGRATION REV. 711, 734 (1991). 
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change of heart by a new administration, or merely reflected due diligence on the part of the U.S. 
delegation, this and many other actions by the United States over the ten year drafting period, 
meaningfully advanced finalization of the Convention. The United States’ dedication of 
resources to the drafting process reflected the United States’ legacy, begun with the UDHR, of 
molding human rights treaties. 
B. Steps Three and Four: Delayed Executive Signature and Submission to Senate, and 
the Slow Move from the “Flying Buttress” to the “Pillar from Within” 
The history of U.S. human rights treaty ratification indicates that the delay between 
promulgation and signature of the Migrant Worker Convention is not unusual. Step three in the 
generic treaty process laid out above appears to anticipate that an Executive, fresh from 
negotiating the terms of a treaty and voting for its promulgation, will sign the document.72 
However, because of the controversial nature of human rights treaties, the more common 
occurrence has been a significant delay between promulgation and U.S. signature. In 2006, the 
Congressional Research Service estimated that the UN, the ILO, and the OAS had produced 50 
multilateral human rights treaties, of which the United States had signed 30.73 For those major 
UN human rights treaties that have been signed, the average wait between promulgation and 
signature has been roughly four years.74 Moreover, three other human rights treaties, signed by 
the President in 1962, 1977, and 1995, have never been submitted to the Senate.75 Thus the vast 
majority of ratified human rights treaties were, or will be, shepherded through the ratification 
process by a President who did not negotiate them, heightening the importance of contemporary 
analysis balanced with the preservation of institutional memories by outside actors.  
 
As the following chart indicates,76 the Migrant Worker Convention is among the human rights 
treaties that the United States has not signed. Moreover, according to a Department of State 
Treaty Analyst, the Executive branch has given “no serious consideration” to signing either the 
Migrant Worker Convention, or the ILO Conventions that deal with migrant workers.77 
                                                
72 See supra text at notes 48-51. 
73 CRS HANDBOOK ON U.S. TREATY MAKING PROCESS, supra note 45, at 285-86. 
74 See infra. Chart 1. Compare this time line with treaties of greater complexity and comparable controversiality, 
such as the United Nations Charter, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the SALT II Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty, all signed the day they were promulgated. See Charter of the United Nations (1945); See also 
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); see also Treaty on 
the Limitation of Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty) art. XIV, June 18, 1979, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. 
Exec. Doc. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1979).  
75 See CRS HANDBOOK ON U.S. TREATYMAKING PROCESS, supra note 45, at 286. 
76 Graph 1 lists the UN human rights treaties classified by the UN as “core human rights treaties,” see International 
Law, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/, the substantive protocols to the core treaties, and also the UN 
Refugee Protocol, which incorporates the substantive provisions of the earlier Refugee Convention. The chart does 
not track ILO Conventions because, by the terms of the ILO Constitution, ILO treaties are subject to a unique 
ratification process that does not lend itself to this analysis. See ILO Constitution Art. 19(5), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm. Examination of the United States record on regional (OAS) human 
rights treaty ratification is also supportive of this proposition, but the regional treaty specifics are omitted from the 
chart because the treaty under examination in the instant article is a international rather than a regional document. 
77 See Email from Joan M. Sherer, Senior Reference Librarian (Legal). U.S. Department of State to Beth Lyon (Jan. 
24, 2008), forwarding email to Joan Sherer from Robert Dalton, U.S. Department of State Senior Advisor for Treaty 
Practice and including comments from Karen Ghaffarkhan, U.S. Department of State Treaty Analyst (on file with 
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In the case of the Women’s Convention, the Senate signaled to the Executive that it would 
welcome signature and thus the opportunity to consider the treaty. Other civil society actors 
carry out signature - and ratification - campaigns as well. The American Bar Association78 and 
Amnesty International79 have been particularly active in these campaigns. Meanwhile, the 
Migrant Worker Convention has received virtually no public attention from the Senate,80 nor 
from civil society. Currently the American Bar Association’s ratification advocacy focus is on 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women.81 Other treaties of high priority for the ABA are the UN Convention Against 
Corruption, the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court, and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.82 Furthermore, the American Bar Association has not yet assessed the 
                                                                                                                                                       
author) [hereinafter Sherer Email].  
78 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Treaties: ABA Urges U.S. Ratification of Women’s Rights Treaty and Law 
of the Sea Treaty, available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/it/2007apr_treaties_factsheet.pdf. 
79 See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S4781 (April 2, 1992) (publishing letter of Amnesty International to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, supporting ratification of the ICCPR); Amnesty International, Support Basic Rights for All 
Women: Urge the U.S. to Ratify CEDAW, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence-against-women/ratify-
the-treaty-for-the-rights-of-women-cedaw/take-action-online/page.do?id=1108265. 
80 A search of the Congressional Record yields only one mention of the Migrant Worker Convention, a passing 
reference in a written statement by the International Council of Voluntary agencies entered into the Record by 
Senator Theodore Kennedy in 1992. 138 Cong. Rec. S. 106, 111 (Jan. 22, 1992). 
81 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA URGES U.S. RATIFICATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS TREATY AND LAW OF 
THE SEA TREATY (2007) (on file with author). 
82 See Legislative and Governmental Advocacy, Governmental Affairs Office, Rule of Law - Global: Funding for 
Domestic and International Agencies that Promote Rule of Law, at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/international_org/#STATUS. 
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Migrant Worker Convention in order to form an initial opinion as to whether or not the document 
should be ratified.83 
 
The lack of attention to the Migrant Worker Convention extends to the U.S. academy. There is a 
literature on U.S. ratification of the CEDAW (Women’s Convention)84 the Rights of the Child 
Convention,85 and other human rights treaties,86 but scarcely any work has been done on the 
Migrant Worker Convention.87 Meanwhile, as noted above, there is a significantly more robust 
commentary regarding the Convention vis-à-vis European standards.88 Even the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, which has commissioned a series of studies on the Convention’s 
prospects for ratification in a variety of countries, has not engaged in such a study with regard to 
the United States.89 
C. Delayed Senate Approval 
                                                
83 Telephonic Interview with Kristi Gaines, Legislative Counsel, Government Affairs Office, American Bar 
Association (January 15, 2008); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, CURRENT THROUGH 
MAY 2008 65-70 & passim (on file with author) (recommending numerous human rights treaties, such as the 
American Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Rome Statute, for ratification). 
84 See, e.g., Ravi Mahalingam, Women’s Rights and the “War on Terror”: Why the United States Should View the 
Ratification of CEDAW as an Important Step in the Conflict with Militant Islamic Fundamentalism, 34 Cal. W. Int'l 
L.J. 171 (2004); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 Yale L.J. 1399, 1460-62 (2003). Ann E. Mayer, Reflections 
on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should the Constitution be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 
23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (1996). 
85 See, e.g., Lainie Rutkow and Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161 (2006); Paula Donnolo and Kim 
K. Azzarelli, Youth, Family and the Law: Defining Rights and Establishing Recognition: Essay: Ignoring the human 
rights of Children: A Perspective on America’s Failure to Ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 5 J. LAW & POL’Y 203 (1996); JONATHAN TODRES, ET AL., THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION (2006). The Convention on 
the Rights of the Child can be found at Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989), corrected at 29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990) 
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
86 See, e.g., Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights: the Need for 
an Entirely New Strategy, 84 A.J.I.L. 365 (1990); Sally Chaffin, Challenging the United States Position on a United 
Nations Convention on Disability, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 121 (2005). 
87 The International Migration Review devoted an issue to the Migrant Worker Convention in 1991, the year after its 
promulgation. That issue included a piece by the late Arthur Helton entitled The New Convention from the 
Perspective of a Country of Employment: The U.S. Case, XXV INT’L MIGRATION REV. 848 (1991). Other U.S. 
scholars have contributed to the literature about the Migrant Worker Convention, see Bosniak, supra note 18, at 311; 
James Nafziger & Barry Bartel, The Migrant Workers Convention: Its Place in Human Rights Law, XXV INT’L 
MIGRATION REV. 771 (1991) [hereinafter Nafziger & Bartel]; Virginia Leary, Labor Migration, in THOMAS 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF AND VINCENT CHETAIL, EDS., MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 227, 234-
236 (2003), Anna Zalewski, Note, Migrants for Sale: The International Failure to Address Contemporary Human 
Trafficking, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L. L. REV. 113, 125-29, 131-34 (2005); Meg Satterthwaite, Crossing Borders, 
Claiming Rights: Using Human Rights Law to Empower Women Migrant Workers, 8 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & 
DEVELOPMENT L. J. 1, 2 & passim (2005), but these studies did not focus on the Migrant Worker Convention vis-à-
vis U.S. law or its ratification by the United States. 
88 See, e.g., EUROPEAN ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY, supra note 38; Giovanni Kojanec, The UN Convention and the 
European Instruments for the Protection of the Migrants, XXV INT’L MIGRATION REV. 818 (1991); Tugrul Ansay, 
The New UN Convention in Light of the German and Turkish Experience, XXV INT’L MIGRATION REV. 831 (1991). 
89 See Email from Antoine Pécoud, International Migration Section, Social and Human Sciences, United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (Oct. 1, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pécoud Email]. 
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From the earliest days of the human rights treaty regime, the Senate has struggled with 
identifying whether and how to incorporate international human rights norms into domestic law. 
Even when the content of a treaty appeared to be unobjectionable, for example in the case of the 
Genocide Convention, concerns about loss of sovereignty appear to hold particular sway in the 
realm of human rights treaty ratification.90 According to Professor Natalie Kaufman, “the actual 
content of the treaties is not viewed as the primary determinant of the current situation. 
Perception is important, not content.”91 Seven human rights treaties are pending on the foreign 
Relations Committee calendar, and six of them have been pending for more than 10 years.92 One 
of them, the ILO Freedom of Association Convention, is the longest pending treaty on the 
Committee calendar.93 Given the sensitive nature of immigration policy, it is likely that a 
Convention on Migrant Worker Rights would also encounter opposition and lengthy debates. 
However, as argued below, it is precisely the controversiality of the subject matter that makes 
debate about international human rights standards valuable at this juncture. 
D. Multiple Restrictions on Ratification 
A common state practice is to restrict treaty ratification, in order to limit the document’s impact 
on the domestic legal system. In its ratification of human rights treaties, the United States has 
taken this practice further than with respect to any other type of treaty.94 The following section 
discusses common restrictions and concludes that, although such restrictions are inadvisable and 
undermine the benefits of ratification, recent U.S. human rights treaty practice makes it virtually 
certain that at least some restrictions will be included in the U.S. ratification of the Migrant 
Worker Convention. 
 
When the earliest human rights treaties were promulgated, the question of the appropriate way to 
handle reservations was unsettled.95 The international community had to strike a balance 
between universality, in the form of widespread ratification, and the integrity of the treaty.96 
Ultimately, the balance that was struck was to permit States Parties to make unilateral 
reservations to human rights treaties, but that only reservations that do not contravene the “object 
and purpose” of the treaty are permissible.97 This balance has been criticized, because the “object 
and purpose” norm has proven to be virtually ineffective as a barrier to unilateral restrictions on 
                                                
90 See CRS HANDBOOK ON U.S. TREATYMAKING PROCESS, supra note 45, at 287-88; see also KAUFMAN, supra note 
53, at 183 (describing the concerns raised against the Genocide Convention over decades). 
91 KAUFMAN, supra note 53, at 181. 
92 See CRS HANDBOOK ON U.S. TREATYMAKING PROCESS, supra note 45, at 286 (listing the ILO Convention on 
Freedom of Association, the ILO Employment Policy Convention, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, and the Geneva Convention Protocol II. The Handbook also lists the Protocols to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which are no longer pending). 
93 See id. 
94 See id. at 286. 
95 See LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND RUIN? 15 (1995) 
(describing the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on how to handle reservations to the 1951 Genocide 
Convention). 
96 See id. at 23. 
97 See id. at 29 (quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
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ratification.98 
 
Likely as a result of the relatively permissive regime that has evolved, the United States has 
regularly applied a set of restrictions that was based on what the late Senator Jesse Helms termed 
the “sovereignty package.”99 Over the years, the “sovereignty package,” as applied in the context 
of human rights treaties, has evolved to include the following restrictions: 1) an “understanding” 
that assures federal- and state- government cooperation to ensure compliance with the treaty;100 
2) a declaration that the terms of the treaty are “non-self-executing,” or not enforceable in 
domestic court, until they have been implemented in domestic legislation;101 3) an understanding 
that “nothing in [the treaty] establishes a basis for jurisdiction by any international tribunal, 
including the International Criminal Court.”102 The “sovereignty package” is controversial 
internationally. The U.S. ratification restrictions have garnered formal protests from other human 
rights treaty members103 and sparked inter-governmental policy statements designed to limit 
restrictions,104 and eliciting widespread censure domestically from constituencies that believe 
that U.S. domestic law should be changed to conform to those international human rights 
standards that are more stringent than U.S. law protections.105 The question of whether non-self-
execution can be read into a treaty that was not ratified contingent on a non-self-execution 
understanding has been the subject of recent debate and litigation,106 but U.S. courts do enforce 
                                                
98 See id. at 95 (stating that “[t]he ‘object and purpose’ rule has been of limited relevance in treaty practice, if 
measured by the number of objections made to reservations to human rights treaties.”) 
99 See KAUFMAN, supra note 53, at 187. 
100 See U.S. Understanding 5, in ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 14; U.S. Understanding, in CERD 
Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 10; U.S. Understanding 6, CRC Child Abuse Protocol Ratification Record, 
supra note 43, at 5; U.S. Understanding 5, CAT Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 7. 
101 See U.S. Declaration 1, in ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 14; U.S. CERD Declaration, in CERD 
Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 10; U.S. Declaration, in CAT Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 6. 
102 See U.S. Understanding 5, in CRC Child Soldier Protocol Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 19. Note also 
that two ratifications involved what Senator Helms termed the “sovereignty proviso,” a reservation included in the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention, and also that was placed in the Senate’s resolution of ratification of the 
Convention against Torture, but not included in the Convention against Torture instrument of ratification deposited 
by the President.  See CRS HANDBOOK ON U.S. TREATYMAKING PROCESS, supra note 45, at 134-35. The 
“sovereignty proviso” stated that the President would not deposit the instrument of ratification until he had notified 
“all present and prospective ratifying parties” that “nothing in this Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or 
other action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by 
the United States.” See id. at 134, 287. 
103 See, e.g., Objection of Denmark to Reservations made by the United States, in ICCPR Ratification Record, supra 
note 43, at 16; Objection of the Netherlands to Reservations, Understandings and Declarations made by the United 
States, in CAT Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 9. 
104 See Catherine Redgwell, US reservations to human rights treaties: all for one and none for all?, in UNITED 
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392, 397-98 (Michael Byers and Georg Nolte, 
Eds., 2003) (describing response of U.N. Human Rights Committee to U.S. restrictions on ICCPR ratification). 
105 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union and Human Rights Watch, ACLU And Human Rights Watch Report on 
U.S. Violations of International Human Rights Covenant: Groups Call on Clinton Administration to Correct Abuses, 
Ensure That International Standards Can Be Invoked in U.S. Courts (Dec. 14, 1993), available at 
http://www.skepticfiles.org/aclu/12_14_93.htm (urging that the United States repeal ICCPR RUDs). 
106 The Supreme Court recently read a treaty to be non-self-executing and thus unenforceable in U.S. court. See 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___ (2008). For recent discussion of this issue, compare Carlos Manuel Vázquez, 
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 
599 (2008) and Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties As 
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explicit non-self-execution ratification restrictions.107 
 
The United States also conditions specific substantive provisions of human rights treaties that 
conflict – or potentially conflict - with domestic law. For example, in its ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the United States reserved the 
right to execute convicted criminals for crimes committed below the age of 18,108 in order to 
shield the U.S. death penalty regime from the ICCPR’s prohibition on the juvenile death 
penalty.109 Similarly, the United States’ ratification of the Child Pornography Protocol was 
conditioned on the United States’ particular understanding of the definition of child 
pornography.110  
 
Professor Louis Henkin argued against restrictions on ratification in the context of an earlier 
human rights treaty: 
 
The first [principle governing executive branch human rights treaty ratification] is 
that, while the U.S. will adhere to this covenant, it will not agree to any change in 
U.S. law as it is today. Mr. Rodley referred to this as unseemly; I have called it 
ignoble and have sometimes thought of it as outrageous. The purpose of adhering 
to a treaty is to undertake obligations, in this case to adhere to a common 
international standard. What sort of convention would you have if every country 
adhered subject to the reservation that it would not make any changes in its laws? 
If the Soviet Union made such a reservation, we would, rightly, reject its 
adherence as fraudulent. . . . Some apparently support such a reservation with the 
argument that it is necessary because it is unconstitutional or undesirable to make 
changes in domestic law by treaty. We have always made changes in domestic 
law by treaty . . . If one did not make domestic law by treaty, there would be no 
sense in, no need for, a clause that declares treaties to be the supreme law of the 
land.111 
 
Since Professor Henkin issued his scathing critique of human rights treaty ratification 
restrictions, the United States has ratified seven human rights treaties, including three 
major United Nations human rights conventions, and as discussed above, has included 
significant restrictions. It is unlikely that the Migrant Worker Convention would be an 
exception to this pattern, particularly given the charged political climate with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manual Vázquez, Laughing At Treaties, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) with John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense 
of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999). 
107 See Curtis Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
529, 539-540 (1999). 
108 See U.S. ICCPR Reservation 2, in ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 14. 
109 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Sept. 8, 1992, 999 U. N. T. S. 171, entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976, at art. 6(5) [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also CRS HANDBOOK ON U.S. TREATYMAKING PROCESS, supra 
note 45, at 291. 
110 See U.S. Understanding 2, CRC Child Abuse Protocol Ratification Record, supra note 43, at 5. 
111 Louis Henkin, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in RICHARD B. LILLICH, ED., U.S. RATIFICATION OF 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS 20, 22 (2d ed. 1985). 
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immigration. Indeed, the International Labour Organization raised concerns about 
moving the migrant worker issue into a UN treaty because of concern that the UN 
process includes the potential dilution effect of restrictions on ratification, and the ILO 
Convention process does not.112 Such restrictions lessen the positive impact of 
ratification, not only on protection for vulnerable groups like migrant workers, but also 
on the enhancement to the United States’ international reputation that ratification brings. 
In the case of the Migrant Worker Convention, restrictions would have an additional 
negative effect in that they would affect the United States its leadership vis-à-vis other 
countries that are still deciding whether and how to ratify. Therefore, while it is likely 
that ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention would be conditioned, it will be very 
important to limit restrictions to the greatest possible extent. 
 
In sum, although I share the opinion that restrictions on ratification constitute a subversion of the 
protective function of human rights treaties, U.S. ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention 
would likely be conditioned on a set of reservations, understandings and declarations, by way of 
an initial package proposed by the Executive upon signature, followed by Senate stipulation 
upon authorization to ratify, and formalized by the final act of ratification by the President. 
These limitations would likely include the longstanding generic reservations, such as the 
federal/state understanding and the non-self-execution declaration, as well as a series of 
substantive reservations and declarations addressing both clear and potential substantive conflicts 
between the Convention and domestic law. The exact nature of any potential substantive 
restrictions on ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention is a large question that lies beyond 
the scope of the present article, but again, in the context of the Migrant Worker Convention, 
limiting such restrictions will be politically difficult but important for the future of the treaty. 
 
III. Domestic Law Assessment of the Migrant Worker Convention 
 
Based on interviews with advocates, and with domestic and international government officials, It 
appears that the Migrant Worker Convention has received virtually no domestic attention in the 
United States from either civil society, domestic or international government, 113 likely because it 
is assumed that any attempt to define immigrants as rights holders is a political non-starter. 
Therefore, none of the relevant actors have completed the work needed to analyze the 
Convention. Thus, the controversial nature of immigrants’ rights leads to a chicken-and-egg 
problem: until the Convention is assessed and ratification can be debated based on specific 
concerns, these political assumptions will remain a self-fulfilling prophecy. Some steps are 
essential to the process of assessing the treaty: 1) a technical legal project to assess the 
Convention in light of U.S. law, so that interested domestic actors can develop their own 
positions on the Convention and formulate potential conditions on ratification; and 2) a domestic 
debate on the relative merit of the Convention in light of U.S. interests and policy aspirations. 
 
                                                
112 See Roger Böhning, The ILO and the New UN Convention on Migrant Workers: The Past and Future, 25 INT’L 
MIGRATION REVIEW 698, 702-703 (1991). 
113 See Sherer Email, supra note 77; Phone interview with Christi Gaines, Legislative Counsel for Government 
Affairs Office at the ABA, January 15, 2008; Pécoud Email, supra note 89. 
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The present article takes first steps in the larger project. The following Section proposes a 
typology for assessing the Migrant Worker Convention through the lens of U.S. law, and 
analyzes provisions of the Convention that potentially affect selected, particularly sensitive 
domestic policies. Each actor in the U.S. migration system – a border patrol official, a Legal 
Advisor to the Department of State, or an unauthorized immigrant worker, would create a 
different map of how exactly the Convention relates to U.S. law, and unanimity is not a realistic 
goal. However, arriving at a common domestic understanding of the major areas of concordance 
and tension is important for any treaty’s prospects. Such an understanding will demonstrate the 
areas of dispute so that the Administration can develop a tentative negotiation package and 
engage with the Senate. 
 
A. Proposed Typology for Assessing Treaty Provisions vis-à-vis U.S. Law 
Assessing any treaty for potential ratification involves a wide range of legal, political, and 
economic considerations. The following proposed typology highlights the information needed to 
examine the Migrant Worker Convention for its domestic legal implications, using comparison 
of norms as well as past U.S. restrictions on human rights treaty ratification as a guide to the 
legal issues that are likely to be pertinent to the debate.   
 
The following section analyzes five different types of relationships between the Migrant Worker 
Convention protections and domestic law. The first is a clear de jure conflict between a 
domestic norm and the treaty provision, where the treaty provision is the more stringent of 
the two. An example of such a norm is Migrant Worker Convention Article 22.9, which states 
that “[e]xpulsion from the State of employment shall not in itself prejudice any rights of a 
migrant worker or a member of his or her family acquired in accordance with the law of that 
State, including the right to receive wages and other entitlements due to him or her.”114 This 
provision conflicts with the U.S. rule stripping lost-wage remedies from unauthorized workers 
whose National Labor Relations Act115 and Title VII rights are violated.116 Thus, at the present 
moment in U.S. treaty practice, such a conflict is likely to result in a reservation limiting this 
country’s international obligation to the level of protection already afforded by the parallel, 
conflicting U.S. standard. 
 
Other Migrant Worker Convention provisions clearly present a less rights-protective standard 
than domestic law. The Migrant Worker Convention, for example, provides for freedom of 
speech117 to a lesser extent than the U.S. Constitution,118 indicating the need for a ratification 
restriction such as the second U.S. Declaration to its ratification of the ICCPR. ICCPR 
Ratification Declaration 2 stated that “[f]or the United States, [the ICCPR provision] which 
                                                
114 UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 22(9).  
115 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (stripping NLRA 
remedies from unauthorized workers).  
116 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Memorandum of Understanding Between The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and The Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair 
Employment Practices, December 18, 1997. 
117 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 75, art. 13. 
118 See Helton, supra note 87, at 857. 
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provides that fundamental human rights existing in any State Party may not be diminished on the 
pretext that the Covenant recognizes them to a lesser extent, has particular relevance to article 
19, paragraph 3 which would permit certain restrictions on the freedom of expression. The 
United States declares that it will continue to adhere to the requirements and constraints of its 
Constitution in respect to all such restrictions and limitations.”119 
 
Treaty provisions about which domestic actors will likely not agree – about which de jure 
conflicts with domestic laws are arguable, are also useful to identify. An example of such a 
Migrant Worker Convention provision is Article 18.1, which requires that all migrant workers 
and family members, including those in undocumented status, have the right to equality with 
nationals of the [State of employment] before the courts and tribunals.”120 Non-governmental 
advocates are likely to argue that the United States’ restriction on Legal-Service-Corporation 
(LSC)-funded service to undocumented immigrants121 violates the Article 18.1 guarantee of non-
discriminatory access to the courts.122 However, the U.S. government is unlikely to see the LSC 
restrictions as conflicting with Article 18.1, given the current state of international law, which 
has rarely considered and does not clearly mandate provision of civil legal services as a matter of 
human right.123 
 
Additionally, provisions that likely involve no de jure conflict with domestic law, but do 
suggest an arguable de facto conflict, are indicators of issues that may have political traction 
but little legal relevance to ratification. An example of such a provision is Migrant Worker 
Convention article 17.1, which requires that “migrant workers and members of their families 
who are deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person…”124 Although there is room for more protective measures to be 
implemented in the law,125 the United States has does have an elaborate legal framework for the 
detention of immigrants126 that, if enforced, is unlikely to run afoul of article 17.1. However, the 
implementation of these domestic standards, and the actual treatment of immigrants in U.S. 
                                                
119 See U.S. ICCPR Declaration 2, ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43.  
120 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 18.1. 
121 Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §2996 et seq (1974). 
122 See Helton, supra note 87, at 854. 
123 Although there is "growing international acceptance of a right to legal representation," see Roger Smith, 
International Obligations and Legal Aid para. 1 (2004), available 
at www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ncjr/atj/turkey/materials/smith, only the European Court of Human Rights has 
found a right to free civil legal services for European countries. See id.; see also Airey v. Ireland [1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 
305 (interpreting Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to find a 
right to free civil legal services in some instances).  An additional question might arise in that, although it begins 
with the general statement about equality of protection “before the courts and tribunals,” the other language of 
Article 18 focuses on rights in criminal proceedings as opposed to civil trials. See UN Migrant Worker Convention, 
supra note 20, art. 18.  
124 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 17.1. 
125 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Immigration Detention Neglects Health, March 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/17/us-immigration-detention-neglects-health (calling on the U.S. government 
to “[i]ssue federal regulations so that the immigration agency's detention standards have the force of law, and 
detained individuals and their advocates have recourse to courts to redress shortfalls in health care;” and [r]evamp 
policies limiting access to non-emergency services.”). 
126 Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Operations Manual ICE Performance Based National Detention 
Standards (Last modified Sept. 15, 2008). 
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detention facilities, has been the subject of significant controversy and litigation.127 For example, 
U.S. courts have made findings of fact that torture and other forms of abuse have been meted out 
in immigration detention facilities located in U.S. territory.128 Nevertheless, human rights 
violations such as these are unlikely to be of grave concern to the U.S. government in making the 
signature or ratification decision, because the Convention does not allow for individual 
complaints.129 Once the treaty was ratified, organizations and individuals could comment to the 
monitoring committee about the United States’ compliance with the treaty, but they could not 
lodge formal complaints. 
 
Finally, it is important to identify treaty provisions that arguably involve neither de jure nor de 
facto conflict. An example of this type of provision in the Migrant Worker Convention is Article 
20.1, which states that “[n]o migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be imprisoned 
merely on the ground of failure to fulfill a contractual obligation.”130 This provision does not 
appear to conflict with any legal or actual U.S. practice.131 
 
These five comparison categories are laid out visually in the following chart, along with the five 
examples from the Migrant Worker Convention discussed above. Each substantive provision of 
the treaty will fall into one of these five comparison categories. 
 
 
 De Jure Conflict Unlikely De Jure Conflict 
Arguable/Likely 
De Facto 
Conflict 
Unlikely 
Article 20.1 No imprisonment for 
contractual violation. 
ICMW is less protective than U.S. 
law: 
Article 13 Allows restrictions on 
Freedom of Speech that are not 
found in U.S. law. 
De Facto 
Conflict 
Arguable/Lik
ely 
Article 17.1 Respect for the inherent 
dignity of detained migrants. (Courts 
have sanctioned the government for 
abuses in immigration detention) 
ICMW is clearly more protective 
than U.S. law: 
Article 25 National treatment with 
respect to termination of the 
employment relationship. (US law 
excludes undocumented workers 
from monetary remedies for 
                                                
127 See, e.g., Jama et al. v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 353 (1998). 
128 Id.  See also Valery Joseph Case, Carmen Gentile, “Group Calls for Inquiry into Death of Detainee.” July 15, 
2008.  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/15immig.html. Jane Guskin “Immigration Detention:  The Case for 
Abolition.”  August 27, 2008. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jane-guskin/immigration-detention-
the_b_121374.html 
129 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 73 (reporting process). 
130 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 20.1. 
131 ICCPR, supra note 109, art. 11 (As reported in the Initial Report, in the United States, imprisonment is never a 
sanction for the inability to fulfill a private contractual obligation). 
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wrongful termination) 
ICMW is arguably more protective 
than U.S. Law: 
Article 18.1 right to equality 
“before the courts and tribunals” 
(U.S. law excludes undocumented 
immigrants from access to LSC-
funded civil legal aid) 
 
 
B. Comparison of the Migrant Worker Convention with Key U.S. Laws 
The Migrant Worker Convention contains seventy-seven substantive articles, which, according 
to my count, break down into 187 separate points of comparison with U.S. law. Analyzing and 
sorting every one of these comparison points into the five categories is a substantial project that 
lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, through selected examples, it is possible to draw 
some initial conclusions about the potential interplay of the Convention and U.S. law. First, 
because half of the convention delineates the fundamental human rights guaranteed to all 
migrant workers and family members, including those who are undocumented, a significant 
portion of the treaty is a recitation of international standards to which the United States has 
already bound itself by virtue of previous treaty ratifications. Second, of five immigrant worker-
related policies identified as having particular importance for the U.S. enforcement branches, 
two partially conflict with the Convention and three are unlikely to be challenged through the 
convention. 
 
1. A Significant Portion of the Convention Overlaps with the United States’ 
Existing International Commitments 
 
The bulk of the Migrant Worker Convention’s seventy-seven substantive provisions are divided 
between 1) protections for all migrant workers and members of their families, including those 
who are in an irregular, or undocumented, status,132 and 2) protections for legally present and 
employed workers and family members.133 The provisions that apply to undocumented migrants 
are, to a great extent, a recitation of international norms to which the United States has already 
acceded by virtue of previous treaty ratifications.134 In fact, twenty-three135 provisions of the 
                                                
132 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, Part III, Human Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, arts. 8-35. 
133 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, Part IV, Other Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families who are Documented or in a Regular Situation, arts. 36-56, and Part V, Provisions Applicable to 
Particular Categories of Migrant Workers and of their Families, arts. 57-63. 
134 See, e.g., UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 8 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 12 and CERD art. 
5(d)); id. art. 9 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 6); id. art. 11 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 8); id. art. 12 (corresponds to 
ICCPR art. 18 and CERD art. 5(d)); id. art. 13 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 19 and CERD art. 5(d)); id. art. 14 
(corresponds to ICCPR art. 17); id. art. 16 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 9 and CERD art. 5(b)); id. art. 17(4) 
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Migrant Worker Convention merely echo the language of treaties the United States has 
ratified.136 An additional two provisions, which do not correspond to protections already ratified 
by the United States, do echo the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,137 a 
document that the United States helped to draft138 and in favor of which this country voted in 
1948.139 Moreover, each of these two provisions – protection from arbitrary deprivation of 
property and right to secondary education for undocumented immigrant children, are both firmly 
established in U.S. domestic law.140 Thus, a significant portion of the Migrant Worker 
Convention overlaps with the United States’ existing obligations. 
 
2. The Convention’s Effect on Five Politically Sensitive Policies 
 
In order to illustrate the types of concerns and analyses that might be involved in an assessment 
of the Convention, the following section examines the application of the Convention to five 
currently politically sensitive American policies: legalization, expedited removal, border 
enforcement, family unification for legal, temporary workers, and worksite enforcement. The 
following analysis argues that most of these policies would go unchallenged by the Convention, 
many of them would be subject only to challenge at the de facto level through ratification of the 
Convention, and only two (expedited removal from the interior and failure to provide some 
forms of family unification for temporary workers) present either arguable or clear de jure 
                                                                                                                                                       
(containing a more enumerated version of the protections found at ICCPR arts. 8-9), id. art. 18 (corresponds to 
ICCPR arts. 14, 26 and CERD arts. 5(a), 6); id. art. 19 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 15); id. art. 20 (corresponds to 
ICCPR art. 11); id. art. 22 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 13); id. art. 23 (corresponds to Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations art. 36, April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261); id. art. 24 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 16); id. art. 26 
(ICCPR art. 22 and CERD arts. 5(d), 5(e)); id. art. 27 (corresponds to CERD art. 5(e)); id. art. 28 (corresponds to 
CERD art. 5(e)); id. art. 29 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 24); id. art. 31 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 27); id. art. 39 
(corresponds to ICCPR art. 12); id. art. 40 (corresponds to ICCPR art. 22 and CERD art. 5(e)); id. art. 42 
(corresponds to ICCPR art. 25 and CERD art. 5(c); id. art. 43 (corresponds to CERD art. 5(e)); id. art. 44 
(corresponds to ICCPR art. 23). For a helpful chart comparing the provisions of the ICMW with seven human rights 
documents, Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at Appendix.  
135 Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 789-99.  See also UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 10 
(corresponds to CAT art. 16); id. art. 16 (corresponds to CAT art. 14).  
136 See supra note 134. 
137 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 15 (corresponds to UDHR art. 17); id. art. 30 
(corresponds to UCHR art. 26). 
138 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE CREATION OF THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 38 (Knopf 2000). 
139 Id. Note that the UDHR is a declaration, not a treaty, and therefore is not as a whole formally binding on the 
United States. See Hurst Hannum, “The Status of the UDHR in National and International Law,” 25 GA. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 287, 289 (1995-96). Some provisions of the UDHR, such as the prohibition on torture contained in article 
5, are now accepted by the United States as binding on this country through the international law devices of 
customary international law and/or jus cogens, Hannum, supra at 306.  See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876, 879 (2nd Cir. 1980) (indicating that the UDHR was part of customary international law), but UDHR Articles 17 
and 26 are not among these. Nonetheless, the United States endorsement of the UDHR weight to the argument that 
the above-mentioned parallel articles in the Migrant Worker Convention (15 and 30) are not foreign to the United 
States.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701 (1987).  
140 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 252 (1982) (holding that undocumented immigrant 
children have a constitutional right to education, as long as it is being offered to others and Congress has not 
asserted responsibility in this area).    
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conflicts. 
 
Although they arise from current American policy debates, these five issues also correspond to 
policy concerns in other countries. There has not been any significant discussion about the 
Convention in the United States, but most of the likely arguments against ratification are 
relatively predictable. For example, a recent study published by the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization noted that, in Europe, the two major legal concerns raised 
against ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention are the “common claim that the ICRMW 
would limit the sovereign rights of states to decide upon who can enter their territory and for 
how long they can remain; and, secondly, the equally ubiquitous fear that the Convention would 
provide for a robust right of family reunification to all migrant workers present in a regular 
situation in the territory of a state.”141 These concerns should be anticipated and addressed in the 
U.S. context as well, and the following section aims to begin this process by comparing five 
particularly sensitive U.S. policies with the Convention. 
a. The Convention Does Not Mandate Legalization 
 
The Convention explicitly places no obligation on States Parties to expand visa numbers or 
engage in legalization of undocumented immigrants. Article 35 of the Convention states that 
“Nothing in the present part of the Convention [Part III, relating to unauthorized workers and 
undocumented family members] shall be interpreted as implying the regularization of the 
situation of migrant workers or members of their families who are [undocumented]…or any right 
to such regularization of their situation…”142 The Convention underscores this point in Article 
34, noting that “Nothing in the present part of the Convention shall have the effect of relieving 
migrant workers and the members of their families from…the obligation to comply with the laws 
and regulations of…the State of employment.”143 Thus the Convention does not purport to take 
any position on the bedeviled legalization question that has increasingly preoccupied Congress 
since America’s last wide-scale regularization in 1986. Article 69.1 does direct States Parties to 
“take appropriate measures” to ensure that the presence within their territory of migrant workers 
and families in an “irregular situation” (undocumented status) does not persist. However, Article 
69.1 does not suggest what measures States Parties should take, leaving the means to individual 
states’ immigration regimes. 
b. Arguable De Jure Conflict with Expedited Removal as Applied in the Interior 
 
Expedited removal is a process by which foreign nationals can be summarily removed from the 
United States after an interview with border enforcement officials.144 Minimal safeguards for 
identifying and protecting asylum seekers, U.S. citizens and permanent residents are included in 
the process, but over the twelve-year history of the expedited removal program, the efficacy of 
                                                
141 See European Assessment of the Treaty, supra note 38, at 51-52. 
142 UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 35. 
143 Id. art. 34. 
144 See e.g. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1228 (an immigration officer need only conduct a preliminary screening to determine 
admissibility before removal) (2009). 
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these protections has been questioned.145 Moreover, in 2004, the Bush administration began 
utilizing expedited removal against undocumented individuals discovered up to 100 air miles in 
from the borders.146 
  
Articles 22 and 23 of the Migrant Worker Convention do provide various due process protections 
in expulsion, but appear not to set limits on decisions of non-admittance. In fact, the U.S. 
representative to the Working Group, along with other delegations, made several statements to 
the effect that such was their understanding. In 1981, early in the negotiations, several 
delegations stated that the Convention needed a provision on “the question of non-admittance of 
undocumented migrant workers at ports of entry in countries of destination.”147 However, the 
official record of the discussions does not reveal that such a provision was ever drafted. In the 
discussions about the Article 23 guarantee of the right to consular access in expulsion 
proceedings, the Argentinean and U.S. representatives stated that consular access rights “should 
not be applicable to persons who have not yet entered the country concerns who have been 
turned back at ports of entry.”148 The United States further argued that the right to consular 
access “should not necessarily apply to all those who are apprehended as illegal migrants shortly 
after crossing the border of the country concerned.”149 In 1987, during the second reading of 
article 22, the German representative stated his opinion that “the notion of expulsion included the 
specific case of a migrant worker who has to be expelled immediately after arriving in a country 
where he was not accepted.”150 The Italian representative responded immediately, stating “that 
the article [22] addressed the case of a migrant worker who might be expelled from the territory 
of a State and not to be the case of a migrant worker who had not yet entered the territory of that 
State.”151 
 
Later still, in 1989, the United States touched on the issue again during the discussion of 
Convention Article 79. Article 79 states that “[n]othing in the present Convention shall affect the 
right of each State Party to establish the criteria governing admission of migrant workers and 
members of their families.”152 In the reported discussion of this language, the U.S. representative 
                                                
145 See KAREN MUSALO, THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY: EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE’S 
SECOND REPORT ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, 18-19 (October 2000), available at 
http://w3.uchastings.edu/ers/reports/10-00_rep1.pdf (last visited February 2, 2009).  
146 A Congressional Research Service report lays out the history of the expanding use of expedited removal by the 
United States: “From April 1997, to November 2002, expedited removal only applied to arriving aliens at ports of 
entry. In November 2002, it was expanded to aliens arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled. Subsequently, 
in August 2004, expedited removal was expanded to aliens who are present without being admitted or paroled, are 
encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. southwest land border, and can not establish 
to the satisfaction of the immigration officer that they have been physically present in the United States continuously 
for the 14-day period immediately preceding the date of encounter. In January 2006, expedited removal was 
reportedly expanded along all U.S. borders.” ALISON SISKIN AND RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS  
RECEIVED THROUGH THE CRS WEB: IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS Summary Page 
(updated May 15, 2006), available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL33109/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).  
147 See November 1981 Working Group Report, supra note 27, para. 64. 
148 See June 1989 Working Group Report, supra note 67, para. 76. 
149 See id. 
150 See June 1987 Working Group Report, supra note 64, para. 102. 
151 See id. 
152 UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 79. 
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stated that “his delegation understood the word ‘admission,’ in this article, in its broadest 
concept, to encompass all terms and conditions pursuant to which migrant workers and members 
of their families may enter and remain in the United States…”153 
 
Despite the ambiguity introduced by the German representative’s statement regarding the 
definition of expulsion, the better conclusion is that the Convention does not regulate refusal of 
entry at ports of entry and at the border.  
 
There is, however, another feature of current U.S. expedited removal policy that may arguably 
come under the purview of Article 22. To the extent that the curtailed processes of expedited 
removal are enforced from within the interior of the United States, the action is likely to be 
defined as expulsion and thus regulated by the Convention. After the expansion of expedited 
removal and its concomitant checkpoints into the interior, the American Civil Liberties Union 
used census data to conclude that “fully TWO-THIRDS of the United States’ population lives 
within this Constitution-free or Constitution-late Zone…[and that n]ine of the top 10 largest 
metropolitan areas as determined by the 2000 census, fall within the Constitution-free 
Zone…Some states are considered to lie completely within the zone: Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island and Vermont.”154 Should future administrations choose to continue to exercise this 
expansive authority, it is unlikely that the application of expedited removal within such a broad 
swath of the United States will be viewed as “non-admittance” as opposed to expulsion. Once 
defined as expulsion, the expedited removal from the interior would be liable to due process 
analysis by the Committee. 
 
Currently, immigration advocates are urging the Obama administration to limit the scope of 
expedited removal to the border itself and ports of entry,155 and/or to seek repeal of the policy 
altogether.156 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has been critical of 
expedited removal policies in the United States157 as well as in Europe,158 where the practice 
originated. The Migrant Worker Committee, the UN body that monitors the ICMW, has 
commented negatively on Mexico’s law that permits the executive branch to immediately deport 
any immigrant for any reason. 159 Mexico’s law is less protective of due process than U.S. 
expedited removal, but the attention paid to Mexico’s law does underscore the fact that due 
                                                
153 See June 1989 Working Group Report, supra note 67, para. 13. 
154 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FACT SHEET ON U.S. "CONSTITUTION FREE ZONE," available at 
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/37293res20081022.html. 
155 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, IMMIGRATION POLICY: TRANSITION BLUEPRINT, 9-10 (Nov. 16, 2008), available at 
http://65.36.162.162/files/ImmigrationTransitionBlueprint_2008.pdf. 
156 Id. 
157 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable 
Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, 1 (Feb. 1999). 
158 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Observations on the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning 
Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, 2 (2005). 
159 See Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of 
the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: Mexico, 
CMW/C/MEX/CO/1  para. 13 (Dec. 20, 2006). 
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process in removal from the interior is liable to scrutiny. 
 
Viewed through the lens of the Article 22 due process limitations on expulsion, American 
expedited removal from the interior would likely violate the Convention on several grounds. At a 
minimum, it would conflict with the Article 22.4 requirement of review of the expulsion 
decision. Moreover, Article 22.6’s requirement that expelled migrant workers be afforded a 
“reasonable opportunity before or after departure to settle any claims for wages and other 
entitlements due to him or her and any pending liabilities”160 would also likely not be met. Thus, 
to the extent that expedited removal from the interior could be viewed as expulsion, both of these 
provisions would likely conflict with U.S. domestic law. In the ratification process, the U.S. 
government is likely, therefore, to seek a restriction on ratification that leaves the United States 
free to pursue interior-expedited-removal. It is important to remember, however, that the port-of-
entry expedited removal proceedings that are actually statutorily mandated are unlikely to 
present an issue under the Migrant Worker Convention. It is only expedited removal from the 
interior, which can be repealed at the will of the Executive, which likely runs afoul of the 
Convention. 
c. The Convention Does Not Challenge Border Policies 
 
The majority of illegal immigration into the United States161 takes place along this country’s 
1,969- mile162 border with Mexico. The United States spends heavily on border-crossing 
prevention, an estimated $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2002.163 Border control funding increased 
519% between 1986 and 2002, and border staffing increased 221% in the same period.164 Border 
control is such a clear priority of the United States government, that one of the few significant 
pieces of immigration-related legislation to pass during the George Bush Administration was the 
“Secure Fence Act of 2006.”165 The Migrant Worker Convention does not specifically mention 
border control, but clearly anticipates that it will be used as an enforcement tool. Article 68 
directs States Parties to collaborate on “measures to sanction illegal or clandestine 
movements,”166 stating that “measures to be taken to this end shall include…measures to detect 
and eradicate illegal or clandestine movements of migrant workers and members of their 
families.”167 To the extent that U.S. domestic actors – government and civil society alike - raise 
concerns about the humaneness168 of the United States’ border control strategies, these concerns 
                                                
160 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 22.4. 
161 See Pew Hispanic Center, Trends in Unauthorized Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow, 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/94.pdf (59% of the United State’s illegal immigrant population comes from 
Mexico). 
162 See U.S.- Mexico Continental Boundary Map, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/US-
Mx_Boundary_Map.pdf 
163 See DEBORAH WALLER MEYERS, US BORDER ENFORCEMENT: FROM HORSEBACK TO HIGH-TECH 
10 (November 2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/publications.php (last visited August 17, 
2008) (chart). 
164 Id. at 21 (chart). 
165 See The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-367 (Oct. 26, 2006). 
166 UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 68.1. 
167 Id. art. 68.1(b). 
168 See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 163, at 22; INS’ Southwest Border Strategy, Resource and Impact Issues Remain 
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might be addressed in the context of the Convention Article 9 right to life,169 just as it has 
already come up in the context of the right to life protection contained in the ICCPR. 170 A recent 
decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American 
States, disallowing a complaint against the United States alleging that U.S. border policies 
violate the right to life, lends weight to the assumption that UN monitors are likely to take a 
cautious approach to the border enforcement issue.171 This assumption is likely to be an 
important element of any American debate on ratifying the Convention, to the extent that 
advocates and officials pressing for signature and ratification would need to dispel concerns as to 
whether the Convention would hamper U.S. sovereignty over its borders.  
d. Family Unification for Temporary Workers: Weakly Mandated Protections Present 
Some De Jure Conflicts 
 
Several Convention articles offer substantive immigration protections to legally present workers 
aimed at protecting family reunification. Article 38 requires States of employment to “make 
every effort to authorize [legally present] migrant workers and [family members] to be 
temporarily absent without effect upon their authorization to stay or to work.”172 With regard to 
workers who are lawful permanent residents, the United States does precisely this, permitting 
LPR-status immigrants to travel abroad for up to six months at a time without running any risk of 
jeopardizing their status. With regard to temporary entrants, however, no such provision for 
temporary travel is made, creating a de jure conflict between Article 38 and U.S. law. 
 
Article 44.2 directs that States Parties “take measures that they deem appropriate and that fall 
within their competence to facilitate the reunification of [authorized] migrant workers with their 
spouses [or equivalents] as well as with their minor dependent unmarried children,” and directs 
that “on humanitarian grounds, [States Parties] shall favourably consider granting equal 
treatment to other family members of migrant workers.”173 As to the first requirement, the 
language “take measures that they deem appropriate” prevents this clause from conflicting with 
domestic law. However, the second phrase requires examining whether those family 
                                                                                                                                                       
After Seven Years 24-26 (August 2, 2001), available at www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-842 (last visited August 
17, 2008) (documenting the increase in deaths a the border and discussing the then-INS’s attempts to reduce the 
death rate). 
169 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 9. 
170 See Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 para. 34 (December 18, 2006) (expressing concern about militarization of the 
U.S./Mexico border) [hereinafter 2006 Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on the United States]. 
171 See generally, e.g., Victor Nicolas Sanchez et al. v. (“Operation Gatekeeper”) United States, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report No 104/05, Petition 65/99 (October 27, 2005), available at 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2005eng/USA.65.99eng.htm (dismissing petition alleging that border policies 
led to deaths of petitioners in violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, for failure to 
exhaust domestic remedies); David C. Baluarte, Challenging Mandatory Deportation Before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights: The Hope of Smith and Armendariz vs. United States, 12 Bender’s Immig. Bull. 
1718 (Dec. 1, 2007) (describing a pending petition challenging mandatory U.S. deportation for past convictions of 
minor crimes). 
172 UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 58.2. 
173 Id. art. 44.2. 
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reunification protections that are in place are being extended to “other family members.” This, 
too, is a weak requirement, using the mandating language of “shall favourably consider,” but if 
that language were interpreted to be binding, the U.S. domestic immigration system would 
present a de jure conflict with Article 44.2 as well. There are numerous instances in U.S. law of 
more favorable treatment for nuclear as opposed to extended, or “other” family members.174 
Similarly, if “favourably consider” is interpreted to be binding, Article 50.1 raises a de jure 
conflict. Article 50.1 requires States to “favourably consider” granting family members of 
deceased or divorced migrant workers authorization to stay and to take into account the length of 
time already resided in that State.175 These provisions, though arguably weakly worded, raise 
potential conflicts that would likely require either a change in U.S. law to guarantee conformance 
or spark a restriction on ratification. Moving toward modifying U.S. law on this point would 
better comport with the United States’ obligation under International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights Article 23.1 to treat the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society[,] entitled to protection by society and the State.”176 
e. The Convention Does Not Challenge Worksite Enforcement 
 
Because the U.S. immigration regime provides few opportunities for legal migration by poor and 
middle-class foreigners,177 the United States economy currently makes jobs available to at least 
7.2 million unauthorized immigrants.178 Bringing down this number is frequently cited as a goal 
by all branches and levels of government.179 Over the past five years, the Executive branch has 
expanded its use of worksite raids in order to address the phenomenon of unauthorized work.180 
In 2002, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) made “25 criminal and 485 
                                                
174 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 277-280 
(5th Ed. 2003) (describing the top U.S. family immigration preference categories as spouses and unmarried children, 
with married children, parents and siblings accorded lower preference).  
175 UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 58.2. 
176 See ICCPR, supra note 109, art. 23.1. 
177 See Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S. Laws that 
Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 587-590 (2004) (describing “the immigration 
law bottleneck that prevents laborers from gaining visas to enter the United States legally for work”). 
178 For the proposition that there are currently 7.2 million unauthorized immigrant workers in the United States, see 
PEW HISPANIC CENTER, FACT SHEET, THE LABOR FORCE STATUS OF SHORT-TERM UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS, 
(April 13, 2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/16.pdf [hereinafter PEW UNDOCUMENTED 
WORKER COUNT]. For the link between the low brown-collar visa numbers and illegal work, see MAUDE-
TOUSSAINT COMEAU, ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND MOBILITY OF HISPANICS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY, 
A REPORT TO THE PEW HISPANIC CENTER 23-25 (2005), available at 
http//:www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/59.1.pdf. 
179 See, e.g., The Agenda: Immigration, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/immigration/ (listing as one 
of the new Administration’s goals to “Remove Incentives to Enter Illegally: Remove incentives to enter the country 
illegally by cracking down on employers who hire undocumented immigrants.”); see also Ordinance 2006-18  
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-
18%20_Illegal%20Alien%20Immigration%20Relief%20Act.pdf (ordinance of Hazelton, Pennsylvania, punishing 
local businesses who hire unauthorized immigrants). 
180 See Lorraine Schmall, Worksite Enforcement of U.S. Immigration Laws, Northern Illinois University Professor’s 
Column 8 (August 20, 2008), available at http://law.niu.edu/law/faculty/column.shtml (last visited September 5, 
2008). 
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administrative arrests” in worksite raids, numbers that have increased every year since, and in 
2007 ICE made 863 and 4077 arrests, respectively.181 Compared with the number of companies 
and individuals employing unauthorized workers in the United States, these are low numbers,182 
but the increase has nevertheless been dramatic and well publicized.183 Any administration 
assessing the Migrant Worker Convention will be concerned that it would not foreclose the use 
of this enforcement tool. The Convention does not specifically address worksite enforcement 
measures, and no provision appears to challenge the use of worksite raids. Indeed, Convention 
Article 68.2 directs that States Parties “shall take all adequate and effective measures to 
eliminate employment in their territory of migrant workers in an irregular situation.”184  
 
One common critique of worksite enforcement raids by the U.S. government is that they target 
workers rather than employers.185 If the United States were to ratify the Convention, likely the 
Committee would not scrutinize the use of worksite raids as a matter of policy, but rather it 
would examine how rights-protective those raids are. In its definition of “adequate and effective 
measures to eliminate [unauthorized] employment,” the Convention mandates that States Parties 
shall sanction employers “whenever appropriate.”186 Apart from this statement, the Convention 
does not inquire into the ratio of employer-to-employee sanctions. Therefore, this domestic 
critique is likely to be contained in a debate over whether the United States is sanctioning 
employers “whenever appropriate.” A second common critique is that some raids are carried out 
in an abusive manner.187 This concern is not specifically addressed in the Convention, but could 
be incorporated in the Article 10 protection against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment,188 or the due process, consular and detention protections in criminal 
prosecution.189 However, given that these ICMW articles mirror provisions of the ICCPR, 10 
mirrors article 7, clause 1 of the ICCPR,190 this protection is already in place for migrant workers 
in the United States and would not create new obligations for the United States. 
 
Article 68 states that unauthorized workers’ “rights vis-à-vis their employer arising from 
employment shall not be impaired by [enforcement] measures.”191 The U.S. Executive generally 
maintains that worksite enforcement is supportive of labor rights. For example, the ICE webpage 
on worksite enforcement currently carries the following language: 
 
                                                
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 See Anna Gorman and Andrew Blankstein, Massive sweep deports hundreds - More than 1,300 are arrested as 
U.S. officials target immigrant criminals in Southland, L.A. TIMES, October 3, 2007, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/03/local/me-immig3; See Associated Press, Hundreds Nabbed in Immigration 
Raid, April 19, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12393925/ 
184 UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 68.2. 
185 See Schmall, supra note 180, at 7. 
186 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 68.2. 
187 See NATIONAL NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS (NNIRR), OVER-RAIDED, UNDER SIEGE: U.S. 
IMMIGRATION LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT DESTROY THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS, 5-10 (January 2008), available at 
http://www.nnirr.org/resources/docs/UnderSiege_web2.pdf. 
188 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 10. 
189 See id. arts. 16, 18.  
190 See ICCPR, supra note 109, art. 7 cl. 1. 
191 Id.  
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Illegal workers frequently lack the employment protections afforded those with 
legal status and are less likely to report workplace safety violations and other 
concerns. In addition, unscrupulous employers are likely to pay illegal workers 
substandard wages or force them to endure intolerable working conditions. In 
addition to alleviating the potential threat posed to national security, ICE’s efforts 
also prohibit employers from taking advantage of illegal workers. ICE’s Worksite 
Enforcement Unit also helps employers improve worksite enforcement of 
employment regulations. 192 
 
In contrast, the argument made by most civil society actors is that worksite enforcement 
increases fear, causing workers in the many work settings that are never raided to refrain from 
asserting their workplace rights.193 This debate, carried into the treaty monitoring process, would 
likely be framed in terms of whether raids are taking place in a way that impairs worker rights; in 
other words, worksite enforcement would likely be found to be de jure compliant with the 
Migrant Worker Convention but arguably de facto non-compliant. As the Migrant Worker 
Committee typically functions, the Committee would likely publish in its periodic commentary 
on U.S. treaty compliance a statement urging the government to take steps to better protect 
worker rights in its enforcement actions. As argued at greater length below, any negative 
reputational effect of this type of reporting would be far outweighed by enhancement of the 
United States international stature as a result of participating more fully in the Migrant Worker 
treaty regime. 
f. Restrictions on Ratification Will Prevent Judicial Reconciliation of De Jure Conflicts  
 
In the fuller assessment of the Convention that this article intends to encourage, differences 
between U.S. law and the Convention will be identified. However, as was emphasized earlier in 
this article, U.S. human rights treaty ratifications typically include a restriction on ratification 
that states that the provisions of the treaty are “non-self-executing;” in other words, that no 
provision may be invoked in domestic U.S. courts unless the legislature has “executed” that 
provision in domestic legislation.194 This provision, along with the various substantive 
restrictions that are likely to limit ratification, appears to block domestic law from any real 
change in the absence of legislative implementation.195 At the same time, even a ratification 
fettered by numerous restrictions can have an impact on domestic law, by bringing domestic 
actors into indirect contact with new standards. 
                                                
192 See, e.g., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement, available at 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/worksite/ (last visited on August 17, 2008).  
193 Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for 
Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 345, 404 (2001), stating that “. . . because courts are unwilling to recognize the 
punitive nature of deportation and the criminalization of immigration law, undocumented workers who assert 
workplace rights remain vulnerable to deportation.” 
194 See supra Section II.D. 
195 See Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of 
Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599-695 (2008) (parenthetical) and Carlos M. Vázquez, Judicial Enforcement of 
Treaties: Self-Execution and Related Doctrines, 100 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 439-448 (2006) (parenthetical).  See 
generally, U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? (Richard 
Lillich ed.) (1981). 
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The history of the juvenile death penalty might seem to challenge this gradualist image. In 1992, 
the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,196 reserving to 
itself the right “to impose capital punishment…for crimes committed by persons below 18 years 
of age.”197 This reservation constituted a direct exclusion of article 6(5) of the ICCPR, which 
banned the juvenile death penalty.198 Although the United States never removed the reservation, 
in 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court banned the juvenile death penalty, referring tangentially to 
international and comparative law in its analysis.199 However, it is unlikely that the ratification of 
the Covenant lay behind this domestic about-face. To the extent that the Supreme Court’s ban on 
the juvenile death penalty came about through the influence of international forces, it was almost 
certainly the overwhelming weight of comparative (foreign) law, not international standards, that 
was persuasive to the Court.200 Even if the ICCPR ratification had weighed heavily with the 
Court, which was unlikely given the explicit reservation to Article 6(5), 13 years was hardly a 
speedy transformation. Moreover, many other examples of de jure conflicts between U.S. law 
and human rights treaties (shielded by restrictions on ratification and therefore arguably not 
constituting treaty violations) remain standing more than a decade after ratification.201 
 
Thus, in the future debate on ratifying the Migrant Worker Convention, the U.S. reversal on the 
juvenile death penalty should be neither cause for hope in the migrant worker rights community 
nor cause for alarm in the anti-immigration community. Given the dearth of comparative 
information available regarding guest worker program protections and unauthorized immigrant 
worker rights,202 it is unlikely that U.S. courts would, in the near term, rely on the Migrant 
Worker Convention in any challenge to sensitive U.S. migrant worker policies. Thus, ratification 
of the Convention would enrich U.S. law and involve the country in much-needed self-
examination process, but would not threaten U.S. sovereignty. As noted above, this limited 
domestic role for ratified human rights treaties was not the original vision for the UN human 
rights treaty regime,203 but it is the likely short-term domestic legal effect of ratification of the 
Migrant Worker Convention in this country. As discussed in the next section, there are many 
reasons for this country to ratify the Convention beyond the Convention’s immediate domestic 
                                                
196 See ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43. 
197 See United States of America Reservation 2, ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43. 
198 See ICCPR, supra note 109, art. 6(5). 
199 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005).  
200See KENNETH ANDERSON, FOREIGN LAW AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. Policy Review, No. 131, pp. 33-50, June-
July 2005; Policy Review, No. 131, pp. 33-50, June & July 2005. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=771124; Beth Lyon, Tipping the Balance:  Why Courts Should Look to International and 
Foreign Law on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker Rights, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 169, 233 (2007) (citing Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)) [hereinafter Lyon, Tipping the Balance]. 
201 See, e.g., U.S. Reservation 5, ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43, (restricting application of ICCPR 
articles 10 and 14 to allow the United States to try juveniles as adults) and 2006 Human Rights Committee 
Concluding Observations on the United States, supra note 170, at 9 (expressing concern about U.S. treatment of 
juveniles as adults for the purposes of criminal prosecution). 
202 See Beth Lyon, New International Human Rights Standards on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker Rights:  
Seizing an Opportunity to Pull Governments out of the Shadows, in ANNE F. BAYEFSKY (ED.), HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND MIGRANT WORKERS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOAN FITZPATRICK 
AND ARTHUR HELTON 551, 571-580 (2005) [hereinafter Lyon, Pull Governments out of the Shadows]. 
203 See supra Section II.D. 
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legal impact. 
 
IV. Ratification Assessment of the Migrant Worker Convention 
 
The following section argues that ratifying the Migrant Worker Convention would help the 
United States in its search for both a more stable migration system and a more rational and 
efficient process for achieving policy reform. The Migrant Worker Convention ratification would 
likely be beneficial to the United States in five general areas. First, ratification would enable 
policy reform by shifting the political climate; second, it would improve the lot of migrant 
workers; third, it would encourage identification and examination of best practices; fourth, it 
would advance foreign policy goals; and fifth, it would engage a growing but estranged political 
minority: Latin Americans. 
A. Engaging with the Convention Would Shift the Political Climate Toward Policy 
Reform 
Currently, a large portion of the U.S. electorate sees enforcement against immigrants as the only 
route out of the country’s current predicament of falling employment opportunities and rising 
numbers of undocumented immigrants. Domestic engagement with the Convention offers the 
potential to increase the electorate’s tolerance for protection-focused solutions to brown-collar 
labor migration. The above-cited UNESCO report on potential ratification of the Convention in 
the European Union states that: 
 
there is a prevailing sense of vaguely negative indifference [to the Convention in 
Europe], in which genuine concerns are combined with simple 
misunderstanding; and this, when confronted with a skeptical public and media, 
has led to the governments of the region generally adopting the path of least 
resistance. Broadly speaking, until the public perception of migrants in general, 
and irregular migrants in particular, changes from an undesirable necessity to an 
understanding of them as rights-bearing individuals, the political incentive to 
inaction in this regard will remain; ratification of the ICRMW, however, should 
be viewed as not merely the end result of such a transformation, but also as one 
of the key means of its achievement.204  
 
If ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention is seen in Europe as a way of moving public 
opinion off the notion that undocumented immigrants are “an undesirable necessity” in favor of 
the notion that they are “rights-bearing individuals,” in the United States it might be said that 
ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention is a way to move people from the notion that 
there is a way to screen out immigrant flows and in the direction of acceptance that immigrants 
are an inevitable part of the U.S. economy. This section argues that debate and ratification of the 
Migrant Worker Convention, by exposing the public to the concept of immigrants as rights-
holders, might further this process.205 As Professor Jules Lobel notes in his study of social 
                                                
204 European Assessment of the Treaty, supra note 38, at 87. 
205 For an argument in favor of viewing unauthorized immigrant workers as the proper subjects of human rights 
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change litigation and political movements, the success or failure of a legal strategy cannot be 
judged merely by the outcome of the particular strategy;206 nor can it be measured in the short 
term.207 Professor Lobel quotes Frederick Douglass: “even if every battle was unsuccessful, 
constant but peaceful struggle would hasten the ultimate coming of needed reforms.”208 
 
Illegal immigration is the central political preoccupation of a significant portion of the American 
public, and one of the top issues of the Presidential elections.209 In a September 2007 poll of 
three politically key states, 34-37 percent of Republicans stated that they could not vote for 
someone who did not share their view on illegal immigration, and 12-24 percent of Democrats 
polled indicated the same.210 All sides of this policy debate are able to agree that they dislike 
illegal immigration. Every interest group has a different reason to feel negatively about illegal 
immigration: from the far right rule of law proponents who see sneaking across the border and 
working illegally as a serious infraction, to ethical employers who do not like the uncertainty and 
risk of hiring clearly unauthorized workers, to undocumented immigrants themselves, who feel it 
is in their best interest to emigrate and send money home, but all of whom would prefer to do so 
legally and in dignity.  
 
What the country cannot agree to is how to solve the problem. Proponents of punishment 
advocate enforcement: using border deployment and deportations to rid America of the problem. 
Employers recommend expanded visa programs that allow for a reliable supply of brown-collar 
workers that come with lower overhead costs (in the form of cheaper housing, less regulation, 
and fewer rights) than are involved with hiring locals. Advocates for the working poor of all 
nationalities urge that enforcement focus on workplace rights such as equal pay, to improve 
working conditions and to limit employer incentives to hire unauthorized immigrants. 
Undocumented immigrants point to their record of contributions to America and advocate for a 
path to earned legalization. Various interest groups who are more politically powerful or 
sympathetic, such as agricultural employers and undocumented children who have achieved 
academic success in America, urge targeted legalization programs that would relieve the 
situation of their particular constituencies. However, the more the undocumented population 
grows and demands lawmakers’ attention, the more politically difficult a solution becomes. Until 
public opinion can coalesce around a solution, even minor adjustments to the status quo will 
remain beyond America’s grasp. 
 
Meanwhile, U.S. immigration laws place the Executive branch in a chronic, untenable position. 
The Executive cannot meaningfully enforce the existing, tight visa restrictions on brown-collar 
                                                                                                                                                       
protections, see Lyon, Tipping the Balance, supra note 200, at 193. 
206 See JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 264-266 (2003). 
207 See id. at 266-267. 
208 See id. at 267 (citing ROBERT CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 793 (2002)). 
209 See The Great Immigration Panic, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/opinion/03tue1.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=2008+election%2C+illegal+immigrati
on&st=nyt.   
210 See LOS ANGELES TIMES/BLOOMBERG: PRESIDENTIAL PICKS IN EARLY CAUCUS AND PRIMARY STATES: STUDY 
#546 25 (2007). The three states are Iowa (34% of Republicans polled and 13% of Democrats polled), South 
Carolina (35% and 12%, respectively), and New Hampshire (37% and 24%, respectively). Id. 
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labor migration, because to do so would threaten the status quo for hundreds of thousands of 
American businesses. At the same time, sealing the border is logistically and ethically untenable. 
Thus, in the short term, there is no enforcement route out of the problem. Despite the fact that the 
United States is the richest country on earth, the Executive branch cannot enforce laws that many 
citizens of the United States are urging it to carry out. The figures of 12 million undocumented 
residents and 6.2 million unauthorized working immigrants are arguably as excessive as 
underage drinking, highway speeding, and tax evasion in the annals of American rule of law 
failures. 
 
The Executive is keenly aware of the problem. For the present administration, President Bush’s 
longstanding relationship with Mexico and the post-9-11 impulse to track foreign entrants only 
heighten the government’s desire to address the situation. The administration has tried to 
legislate a way out of the conundrum by suggesting that Congress use the tools migrant-receiving 
countries around the world typically use when undocumented populations build to a crescendo: 
legalization, and expanded legal opportunities for brown-collar labor migrants to enter the 
country. To win over the “anti-immigrant” (pro-enforcement) wing of his party, President Bush 
attempted to get across two messages: that he favored strong enforcement, in the form of 
heightened border security and increased workplace enforcement, but that legalization was also 
necessary in order to ensure sufficient workers for American businesses. 
 
After years of close Congressional attention, public demonstrations, and Executive support for 
immigration reform, however, the pro-enforcement lobby has blocked all attempts at significant 
legislation. This failure extends even to politically well-grounded proposals like the agricultural 
jobs bill. This bill would have legalized the status of undocumented farm workers, and it was 
forged by a hard-won agreement of industry and worker rights groups. Its failure illustrates that 
the American public is extremely difficult to educate about two politically unpopular truths 
regarding brown-collar labor migration: first that labor migration is inevitable, and second, that 
border control and deportation are insufficient enforcement tools. Therefore, the U.S. 
government will have to carry on providing symbolic enforcement of an increasingly absurd 
mandate. In aid of this mission is the only relevant legislation that has achieved passage in recent 
years is the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which devoted significant additional monies to 
construction and enhancement of the U.S.-Mexican border fence. 
 
Meanwhile, the human consequences of this failed legal regime make the United States the 
object of increasingly morbid fascination internationally. In the eyes of the rest of the 
industrialized world, the suffering along the southern border and the sheer size of the illegal 
migrant population in this country rank with the death penalty, gun violence, and homelessness 
as peculiarly American failings. 
 
Non-enforcement methods to ensure that immigration laws are respected decrease employer 
demand for unauthorized immigrant workers and decrease the push-factors motivating people to 
leave behind their communities in search of employment in the United States. To decrease 
employer incentives to hire foreign nationals without working papers would be a long-term 
process requiring the enforcement of underutilized labor laws and the use of technology to 
monitor every employment relationship. Furthermore, to decrease the number of workers willing 
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to run risks to enter or work illegally in this country would require targeted development 
assistance aid to reduce the push factors. 
 
Despite the post-9/11 political atmosphere, the Bush administration has made genuine attempts 
to educate the American public on this issue by putting pressure on employers who flout 
immigration laws. For example, the administration took on WalMart in a high-profile 
immigration prosecution, expanded workplace raids and prosecutions against employers of 
unauthorized workers, and enlisted state and municipal localities for workplace raids. Most 
important are two employer-focused initiatives that the administration has quietly advanced. 
Firstly, early in the administration, the Social Security Administration began to blanket the 
country with social security “no-match” letters, alerting employers when the numbers under 
which earnings were reported did not match the employees’ names. Currently, employers are 
under no obligation to fire employees about whom a no-match letter has been issued. However, 
in August 2007, the Administration issued regulations requiring employers to fire employees 
who do not furnish proof of a legal right to work within ninety days of the no-match letter.211 
The Administration’s second key initiative that proactively involves employers in immigration 
enforcement has been the government’s continued promotion of “E-Verify,” which provides a 
way for employers to confirm an employee or prospective employee’s work authorization 
status.212 However, as these policies played out, the regulatory impact fell generally on workers 
and on scrupulous employers rather than on unscrupulous employers. 
 
The Bush Administration also demonstrated its view of the importance of the “demand” element 
of illegal migration in litigation before the Supreme Court, in a case called Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board213. In that case, an employer appealed the 
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 
had fired a group of workers who voted to form a union. The National Labor Relations Board 
ordered repayment of damages that included back pay, or the pay lost as a result of the unlawful 
firing. The employer appealed, arguing that unauthorized workers should not receive pay for 
work for which they were not legally “available.” The Solicitor General’s brief for the National 
Relations Board cited an earlier Circuit Court opinion that “the limited backpay award reduces 
employers’ incentives to prefer undocumented workers (the IRCA’s goal), reinforces collective 
bargaining rights for all workers (the NLRA’s goal) and protects wages and working conditions 
for authorized workers (the goal of both Acts).”214 The Hoffman Plastic Compound dissent 
endorsed the administration’s view, stating that “the National Labor Relations Board’s limited 
back pay order will not interfere with the implementation of immigration policy.  Rather, it 
                                                
211 On October 28, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security published a “Supplemental Final Rule” which DHS 
hoped would address a concern with its prior final rule which had led to the rule being subject to an injunction order.  
Although DHS has motioned to have the injunction lifted, the judge has not lifted the injunction as of March 24, 
2009.  There is not expected to be a resolution to the issue until at least the end of March 2009.  NAFSA:  
Association of International Educators.  Available at 
http://www.nafsa.org/regulatory_information.sec/no_match_letter_rule. 
212 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, E-Verify, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=75bce2e261405
110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=75bce2e261405110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD.   
213 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
214 Hoffman Plastic Compound, Inc. v. NLRB, 2000 U.S. Briefs 1595 at 10 (U.S. June 18, 2001). 
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reasonably helps to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to 
prevent.”215 The five-Justice majority, however, found that “recognizing employer misconduct 
but discounting the misconduct of illegal alien employees, subverts [the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act].”216 
 
These failed efforts of a Republican administration to bring about immigration reform and 
influence the Supreme Court in favor of unauthorized immigrant worker rights demonstrate a 
significant alignment of interests between the left and the right political establishments in favor 
of softening public opinion on migrant workers. As argued above, a movement of public opinion 
in this direction is not in the best interest of any but the most committed anti-immigration 
policymakers, because the vast majority of politicians in both parties would like to bring about 
some type of comprehensive immigration reform, and anti-immigrant public sentiment has 
thwarted numerous serious efforts to do so. It stands to reason, then, that for most federal 
government actors, a potential downside of pursuing ratification of the Migrant Worker 
Convention would be its potential to spark a controversy that would inflame public opinion 
against migrant worker rights.  
 
This potential is not of great concern, however. It is certainly possible that a first step toward 
ratification, such as a Senate hearing or Presidential signature on the treaty, could spark a hue 
and cry against ratification. Controversy would likely arise on several counts. As discussed 
above, the traditional American concern about human rights treaties, namely the protection of 
sovereignty and the flaws of the United Nations, would arise. This particular Convention would 
generate concerns about the fact that it explicitly protects an unpopular group - unauthorized 
workers – and, depending on the situation at the time of the controversy, about the fact that there 
are few other ratifications by countries of employment. It may even be possible that the 
Executive would decide to reverse itself, as did President George W. Bush in the wake of 
President Clinton’s signature on the Rome Convention establishing the International Criminal 
Court,217 although this was generally considered to be an extreme act218 and the nature of the 
concerns about the ICC were quite different.219 
 
Even if such a controversy were to arise, however, the controversy itself would serve a positive 
purpose. The airing of concerns would inescapably communicate to the public that in at least one 
major international treaty, immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, are the subjects of 
rights. Given the current nature of the debate, this would, for many members of the electorate, be 
a novel message. The public education benefits of U.S. signature of this treaty, even if followed 
in the short-term by a failed ratification campaign, would be well worth the controversy 
involved. 
                                                
215 Hoffman Plastic Compound, Inc., 535 U.S. at 153. 
216 Id. at 150. 
217 Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Court Treaty, American Society of 
International Law, May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm#_edn1. 
218 See Human Rights Watch, United States "Unsigning" Treaty on War Crimes Court, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/05/05/united-states-unsigning-treaty-war-crimes-court (calling the Bush 
Administration action “an unprecedented diplomatic maneuver”). 
219 See Bradley, supra note 217. 
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B. Signature and Ratification of the Convention Would Advance Foreign Policy Goals 
1. Ratifying Would Improve the U.S.-Mexico Relationship 
 
Ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention would favorably impact the United States’ 
relationship with Mexico, a key partner in both trade and drug interdiction, because it is a major 
country of origin for immigration into America. Currently, Mexico is the top country of origin 
for both legal and illegal immigration into this country,220 and the Mexican government’s 
political and material support for immigrants in the United States is widely documented.221 With 
roughly ten percent of its electorate living in the United States222 and boosting the Mexican 
economy through remittances,223 the Mexican government is strongly motivated to advocate for 
its expatriates.224 Mexico has been publicly critical of the United States’ failure to regularize the 
status of undocumented Mexicans, and has backed formal complaints in numerous international 
fora concerning U.S. labor and death penalty policies.225 Despite the fact that Mexico itself is a 
major immigrant-receiving country,226 the Mexican government has helped establish immigrant-
protective international law standards. For example, Mexico took a significant leadership role in 
the formation of the Convention. A Mexican representative chaired the treaty formation working 
                                                
220 Migration Policy Institute, US in Focus: Mexican Immigrants in the United States (April 2008), available at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=679#1. 
221 See Ginger Thompson, Fox Urges Congress to Grant Rights to Mexican Immigrants in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2001, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/07/world/fox-urges-congress-to-grant-rights-to-mexican-
immigrants-in-us.html?scp=6&sq=Mexico's%20support%20for%20immigrants&st=cse.  See also Ginger 
Thompson, Mexico’s Leader Says He’ll Persevere on Migration, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2005, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07EED71431F933A05752C1A9639C8B63.   
222 See Migration Policy Institute, supra note 220. 
223 A Pew Hispanic Center Poll dated January 2006 found that 58% of adult Mexicans living in the United States 
had sent money to someone in Mexico over the past year.  Poll results available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/questions/?qid=1714184&pid=54&ccid=54#top.  See also Mexico received approximately 
$25 billion dollars in remittances in 2007.  The World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008.  Available 
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Top10.pdf.  See also 
Remittances May Buoy Developing Countries Caught in Financial Crisis, The World Bank, November 24, 2008, 
available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21996712~pagePK:64257043~piPK:4373
76~theSitePK:4607,00.html.  (The average value of remittances sent by Mexican migrants has remained in the 
$340-$350 range per transaction since 2005). 
224 See Thompson, supra note 221. 
225 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31) (Medellin 
Case) (Mexico alleged that the U.S. failed to notify Mexican citizens accused of crimes in the U.S. that they had a 
right to notify their consulate through the Vienna Convention), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Right to 
Information on Consular Assistance within the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory 
Opinion, OC-16/99, October 1, 1999 Series A No. 16 (suggesting that foreign nationals be informed that they can 
seek assistance from their consulate prior to giving a statement and that the death penalty should not be executed 
where there was not consular notification) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Legal Status and Rights of 
Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, September 17, 2003 , Series  A No. 18 (recognizing that 
individual rights guarantees apply to migrants, regardless of their immigration status) [hereinafter OC-18]. 
226 Mexico received 644,361 immigrants in 2005, making up 0.6% of the population. The World Bank Migration 
and Remittances Factbook 2008.  Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Mexico.pdf.  
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group throughout the ten years of negotiations.227 Mexico’s commitment to the Convention 
continued in the form of its early ratification of the Convention – Mexico was only the eleventh 
country to ratify228 - and now is manifested in its active engagement with the Migrant Worker 
Committee.229 Given Mexico’s concern for its nationals in the United States, belief in 
international law mechanisms, and history as one of the primary sponsors of the Convention, the 
Mexican government would likely view positively a serious examination of the Convention by 
the United States. 
2. Ratifying Would Increase World Leadership vis-à-vis the Global South 
Ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention would likely increase U.S. influence with other 
countries of migration origin, in addition to Mexico. One of the most commonly advanced 
arguments in favor of the United States past human rights treaty ratifications has been that, by 
subjecting itself to international scrutiny, this country becomes a more credible and effective 
advocate with countries that it attempts to influence on rights questions.230 In a recent meeting 
with the Department of State officials responsible for reporting to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the official representing the National Security 
Administration repeated this assertion.231 This argument has been raised to support ratification of 
treaties that primarily implicate domestic concerns. It seems that the foreign policy effect of 
participation in the Migrant Worker Convention regime would be even more pronounced than 
with respect to other human rights treaties, because this country has ratified only one other treaty  
with an exclusive focus on foreign nationals. That treaty is the Refugee Protocol,232 but refugee 
protection and migrant worker protection are very different from one another. It stands to reason 
that countries of origin would not pursue protection for refugees, who are claiming persecution 
in their countries, as they might for their citizens who are economic migrants. Therefore, if 
Southern countries indeed credit U.S. human rights treaty participation to the extent that the U.S. 
foreign policy branches report, the effect is likely to be even more pronounced in the case of the 
                                                
227 See, e.g., November 1980 Working Group Report, supra note 27; November 1981 Working Group Report, supra 
note 27; June 1982 Working Group Report, supra note 27; November 1982 Working Group Report, supra note 27; 
June 1985 Working Group Report, supra note 27; October 1985 Working Group Report, supra note 65; October 
1986 Working Group Report, supra note 60; June 1987 Working Group Report, supra note 64; June 1989 Working 
Group Report, supra note 67 (listing Antonio Gonzalez de Leon of Mexico as the Chairman of the Working Group). 
In the last year of negotiations, Mexico’s Claude Heller took over as Chairman. See Report of the Economic and 
Social Council, Report of the open-ended Working Group on the Drafting of an International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, A/C.3/45/2 (October 21, 1989); June 1990 
Working Group Report, supra note 27. 
228 See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families New York, 18 December 1990, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/13.htm.  
229 See, e.g., Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families: 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 73 of the Convention: Initial Reports of States 
parties due in 2004: Mexico CMW/C/MEX/1 (November 18, 2005), 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/451/76/PDF/G0545176.pdf?OpenElement. 
230 See KAUFMAN, supra note 53, at 197-98. 
231 See Beth Lyon, Memorandum to 9/11 Committee (Jan. 17, 2008) (on file with author) (describing meeting on 
January 16, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 CERD State Department/NGO Meeting Notes]. 
232 Note that one provision of the Convention Against Torture relates to foreign nationals. Article III of the 
Convention forbids States Parties from deporting immigrants to countries where they would experience torture. See 
1465 UNTS 85, Article III (1984). The other human rights treaties that the United States has ratified provide only 
limited explicit treatment of foreign nationals. 
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Migrant Worker Convention. Moreover, if the United States were to move forward in the 
ratification process in advance of other countries of employment, the positive influential impact 
with countries of origin would undoubtedly be enhanced.  
 
Similarly, the Convention’s current lack of ratifications by wealthier countries of employment233 
presents an unusual opportunity for the United States vis-à-vis its allies in the industrialized 
world. The industrialized world has been relatively more prompt than the United States to ratify 
the United Nations’ other human rights treaties. As described in the chart contained below at 
Appendix II, for the three major UN human rights treaties it has joined, the United States 
averaged 270 months between promulgation and ratification.234 By contrast, the other nine 
nations in the list of the top countries of migrant employment (Russia, Germany, Ukraine, 
France, Saudi Arabia, Canada, India, the UK, and Spain)235 took an average of 98 months after 
promulgation to ratify the same three treaties.236 In fact, of these nine countries, only Saudi 
Arabia, which has not yet ratified the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, has a higher average 
promulgation time than the United States.237 Taking the lead in ratifying – or simply signing- the 
Migrant Worker Convention would be noted by wealthy countries that are beginning to consider 
ratification and would give the United States, to a far greater extent than have the past 
ratifications, a human rights leadership moment that this country badly needs as it attempts to 
convince its industrialized world allies to support its foreign policy priorities. Even if individual 
countries of employment were to view U.S. steps toward ratification as a negative development 
because they do not want to be pressured into making a similar commitment, signature and 
ratification would be a modest but undisputable sign of leadership at a time when the U.S. human 
rights record has been tarnished by multiple incidents of torture of foreign nationals in U.S. 
military prisons238 and post-9/11 restrictions on domestic civil liberties.239  
 
3. U.S. Ratification Would Encourage Additional Ratifications  
 
U.S. signature or ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention could convince other countries 
of employment to give more serious consideration to the treaty. The participation of other 
                                                
233 See Status of Ratification for ICMW, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=138&chapter=4&lang=en.   
234 See infra Appendix II: Treaty Ratification Timing by Top Ten Countries of Migrant Employment. 
235 See World Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Top 10, in Migration and Remittances Factbook (2008), 
available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21352016~pag
ePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html (this list refers to the top ten countries of migrant 
employment numerically as opposed to per capita). 
236 See infra Appendix II: Treaty Ratification Timing by Top Ten Countries of Migrant Employment. Note that two 
of these countries have not yet ratified one of the three treaties. Saudi Arabia has not yet ratified the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and India has not yet ratified the Convention Against Torture (CAT). See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See also The Torture Report, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at 42, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/opinion/18thu1.html?scp=6&sq=Guantanamo+torture&st=nyt. 
239 See also Spies, Lies and Wiretaps, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/opinion/29sun1.html?scp=10&sq=domestic+civil+liberties&st=nyt. 
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countries is frequently cited in human rights treaty ratification debates in the United States,240 
and human rights treaties’ track records is relevant to the ratification processes of other countries 
as well.241 It is likely that a decision by the United States to endorse the treaty, even with 
multiple limitations on ratification, could influence other potential signatories. Given the limited 
participation by countries of employment in the Convention, the United States could 
meaningfully advance the state of international law on this issue by influencing other wealthy 
countries’ ratification processes. Moreover, ratification by other industrialized countries would 
offer greater protection to American citizens who are themselves migrant workers living and 
working abroad, the majority of whom, by last reported figures, are in industrialized countries.242  
 
4. Ratifying Would Enable the United States to Shape Interpretation of the 
Convention 
 
By not participating in the Convention’s monitoring regime, the United States and the other 
countries of employment are losing the opportunity to influence the Committee’s interpretations 
of the document. The treaty went into force in 2003,243 and the Committee convened for the first 
time in 2004.244 Throughout its first years in operation, the Committee is not only forming its 
working methods and priorities, but is also giving sustained consideration to the provisions of the 
Convention, the first time the international community has done so since the negotiations in the 
1980s. The other UN human rights monitoring bodies have made it a practice not only to 
comment on individual member states’ compliance, but also to issue periodic statements, called 
“General Comments,” contain general interpretations of particular provisions of the treaty the 
monitor,245 and over time the Committee on Migrant Workers will be doing the same.246 The 
closer access and contact that comes with treaty ratification and monitoring participation would 
give the United States greater opportunity to anticipate and influence these interpretations. 
 
Of course, if the United States decides to eschew the Convention altogether, then the 
interpretation given to the treaty’s provisions might seem to be irrelevant. However, international 
law standards can be imported into domestic law in several ways other than through treaty 
ratification. Most notably in the United States, courts are bound to apply international law if it 
has risen to the level of jus cogens and/or customary international law,247 and they are permitted 
                                                
240 See KAUFMAN, supra note 53, at 197-98. 
241 See Pécoud & Guchteneire, supra note 3, at 258-259. 
242 See AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD, AMERICAN CITIZENS LIVING ABROAD BY COUNTRY (2002), available at 
http://www.aca.ch/amabroad.pdf (noting that, in 1999, 17% of Americans abroad lived in Canada, 28% lived in 
Europe, 4% lived in Israel, 2% lived in Australia, 2% lived in Japan, and .4% lived in New Zealand). Notably, 25% 
of Americans living abroad are in Mexico, a country that has already ratified the Convention. See id. 
243 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 22(9). 
244 See OHCHR Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cmw/.   
245 ANNE BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 5 (2001). 
246 See Committee on Migrant Workers, available at http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=4313&URL_DO=DO_PRINTPAGE&URL_SECTION=201.html (stating that “The Committee will also 
publish its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions, known as general comments on thematic 
issues.”). 
247  See, e.g., REST 3d FOREL § 111(1) (stating that international law and international agreements of the United 
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to use international law as persuasive authority.248 
 
In addition, an opportunity to influence the law at the international level is particularly important 
for countries in the Americas, given the current lack of a similar instrument at the regional level, 
and also given the Inter-American human rights system’s demonstrated interest in the issue of 
migrant workers.249 International human rights standards that are already clarified can provide a 
persuasive context for shaping new standards at the regional level. Influencing the interpretation 
of the Migrant Worker Convention offers the United States a meaningful opportunity to shape 
the ultimate development of regional law. 
                                                                                                                                                       
States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several States); Id. § 111(4) (stating that 
“customary international law is considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is federal law. A 
determination of international law by the Supreme Court is binding on the States and on State courts.”); Id. § 111 
Reporters’ Notes 3 (stating that “the modern view is that customary international law in the United States is federal 
law and its determination by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper 
Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 244 (2d Cir.2003), quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 811 (2d Cir.1980), quoting 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900)); Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
250 F.3d 1145, 1145 (7th Cir. 2001). 
The most likely development of jus cogens in the field of migrant worker rights is the norm of non-discrimination. 
In 2003, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2003 asserted that non-discrimination has now risen to the level 
of jus cogens and is thus a binding global norm. See Advisory Opinion on Juridical Condition and Rights of the 
Undocumented Migrants. OC-18/03. Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR). 17 September 2003. 
Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/425cd8eb4.html. The Inter-American 
Court applied non-discrimination to unauthorized immigrant workers, declaring that non-discrimination gives them 
the right to equality of treatment with other workers. See id. at 53. Note that a country can avoid the imposition of 
customary international law by objecting to the norm. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993), citing REST 3d FOREL § 102 Comment d.  However, given that the 
United States has not engaged the treaty even to the extent of accepting or rejecting particular provisions, it has not 
placed any such rejections on record. 
248 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (stating that “[t]he right the petitioners 
seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries”); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (recognizing that “[t]he Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to 
international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishments,” citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality 
opinion). See also Daniel J. Frank, Constitutional Interpretation Revisited: the Effects of a Delicate Supreme Court 
Balance on the Inclusion of Foreign Law in American Jurisprudence, 92 IALR 1037, 1037 (March 2007); but see id. 
at 1039 (stating that “[t]he current composition of the Supreme Court may compromise the continued use of foreign 
law as persuasive authority on certain American constitutional issues”).  
For a discussion of the possible approaches a U.S. court might take in looking to international standards on 
unauthorized workers as persuasive authority, see Lyon, Tipping the Balance, supra note 200, passim. 
249 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has convened two ad hoc situation hearings on migrant 
workers in the United States, see Rebecca Smith, Human Rights at Home: Human Rights As an Organizing and 
Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker Communities, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RATS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 285, 308-309 (2007) 
[hereinafter Smith, Human Rights at Home). Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Chapter II, Legal 
Bases and Activities of the IACHR During 2006, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR 2006 PARA 19, at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/Chap.2.htm#124th. The Commission also has in place a Special 
Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and their Families, see Case Law, available at 
http://www.cidh.org/Migrantes/migrants.caselaw.htm.  In 2003, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a 
landmark advisory opinon on the rights of unauthorized workers, see OC-18, supra note 225, and it has issued 
various other decisions touching on the rights of migrants. See supra note 225 & text. Moreover, a regional 
convention on migrant workers is currently in force in Europe. See Council of Europe, European Convention on the 
Legal Status of Migrant Workers, 24 November 1977. ETS 93, available at http://www.aca.ch/amabroad.pdf. 
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By participating in this regime, the United States would have a significantly greater opportunity 
to urge its preferred interpretations. For example, a U.S. national would likely gain a place on the 
Committee. The Committee members250 are nominated by the States Parties and elected by secret 
ballot.251 States Parties are permitted to nominate their own nationals,252 and the Convention 
instructs States Parties to cast their votes with “due consideration” to “equitable geographical 
distribution, including both States of origin and States of employment, and to the representation 
of the principal legal systems.”253 This explicit assurance of participation for the nationals of 
States of employment recognized the polarity inherent in the migrant worker rights field and is 
borne out by the current operations of the Committee selection process. Presently, both Mexico 
and Turkey, the two most significant countries of employment in State party status with the 
Convention, have nationals serving on the Committee.254  
 
Mexico’s participation on the Committee has implications which, from the U.S. government’s 
perspective, likely cut both ways with regard to ratification. First, as a participant in shaping 
international law, it seems all the more urgent for the United States to engage with the 
Committee as a State Party, as this country’s own principal source country for migration255 is 
actively engaged in shaping the interpretation of the Convention. However, the fact that Mexico, 
at least currently, has a national on the Committee also raises the concern that allowing a 
Mexican national to participate in the concluding observations regarding U.S. compliance with 
the treaty would result in outcomes less favorable to the U.S. government position. The former 
argument, however, should outweigh the latter, for several reasons. 
 
First, the Committee selection process is such that partisan influence is more likely to play a role 
in the general interpretive function than in individual country determinations. Member states are 
expected to appoint “experts of high moral standing, impartiality and recognized competence in 
the field” 256 who serve in their individual capacity.257 The opportunity to shape the General 
Comments is an important one, and therefore gaining a role in the interpretation process is worth 
the slightly heightened risk of unenforceable, negative language directed at this country over 
particular policy issues. Moreover, engagement yields understanding on both sides and can 
therefore lead to mutually satisfactory approaches. 
                                                
250 Currently there are ten committee members. See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 72.1(b). 
After the Convention has garnered its forty-first ratification, the committee will grow to fourteen members. See id. 
251 See id. art. 72(2)(a). 
252 See id. 
253 See id. 
254 As of September 2008, Francisco Alba of Mexico and Mehmet Sevim of Turkey are serving on the Committee. 
See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/members.htm. 
255 In 2007, there were 11.7 million foreign born people from Mexico living in the U.S., accounting for 30.8% of all 
immigrants in the U.S.  Migration Policy Institute, available at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=714#7.  Approximately seven million people 
originating from Mexico were in the United States without authorization, 59% of the total number of unauthorized 
U.S. residents in 2007.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Residing in the United States:  January 2007” available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2007.pdf.   
256 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 72(1)(b). 
257 See id. art. 72(2)(b). 
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As a party to the treaty, the United States would also be able to help immigrants in other national 
settings, by educating the Committee – and, by extension, other participating countries - about its 
own best practices vis-à-vis migrant workers. For example, a common concern of migrant 
worker advocates in the global south world is the condition of immigrants in detention. As noted 
above,258 the United States has an elaborate set of standards in place for the protection of 
immigrant detainees that could be of persuasive value for other countries. Another example of a 
creative practice in the United States is its system of training and licensing non-lawyers, 
including law students, to represent immigrants on a pro bono basis before the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Immigration Courts.259 In other countries that may lack robust legal 
aid services for immigrants, this model could be of utility. By airing unique policies that 
successfully implement treaty standards, the United States can support the development of 
international law. 
 
C. Engaging with the Convention Would Educate U.S. Officials on Best Practices 
 
Participating in the Convention monitoring process would be a valuable opportunity for the 
United States to identify foreign best practices in the treatment of migrant workers. This author 
has argued elsewhere that next to no comparative research is being carried out at either the 
advocacy, academic, or government levels regarding the treatment of unauthorized immigrant 
workers,260 which form the focus of 28 substantive provisions of the Migrant Worker 
Convention.261 Legal migration for work has received more attention,262 both at the regional 
level and internationally. However, these fora do not provide the same opportunities for 
identifying best practices as would the Migrant Worker Convention process. 
 
According to the Organization of American States, at least 20 initiatives, sponsored by more than 
14 inter-governmental organizations, currently focus on migration in the Americas. 263  These 
programs are sponsored by sub-regional arrangements such as MERCOSUR,264 regional bodies 
such as the Organization of American States and the Regional Conference on Migration (known 
as the Puebla Process),265 and by international organizations such as the International 
                                                
258 See supra Section III.A.  
259 See 8 C.F.R. 292.1-292.2 (2008) (creating a category of “Certified Representatives” who may provide legal 
services at no charge to indigent immigrants. 
260 See Lyon, Pull Governments out of the Shadows, supra note 202, at 571-581. 
261 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, at Sec. III, arts. 8-35. 
262 OIM, Martin, Southern Poverty Law Center, Human Rights Watch  
263 See PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION 
ISSUES, SUMMARY OF CURRENT PROGRAMS DEALING WITH MIGRATION IN THE AMERICAS: OAS GENERAL 
SECRETARIAT AND INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, OEA/Ser.G, CE/AM-36/08 
rev. 1, at 23 (June 18, 2008) (English version), available at  
< http://www.oas.org/consejo/specialcommittees/Special%20Committe%20Migration.asp> (passim) (scroll down to 
“Migration Programs”). 
264 See id. at 23. 
265 See id. at 23-24. 
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Organization on Migration,266 the International Labour Organization,267 and the International 
Red Cross.268 Most of these initiatives, which range from standard-setting to community 
trainings, provide the opportunity to identify and replicate best practices in migration policy. At 
least half of these programs are concentrated in the global south and do not focus on the 
treatment of migrant workers within the countries of employment.269 Only a sub-activity of one 
of them, the Pan-American Health Organization’s Hispanic Forum project on Latino 
occupational health in the United States, maintains a concentrated focus on U.S. policies.270 Only 
two, the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the International Labor 
Organization, have examined migrant workers in the United States from a rights perspective, and 
these instances have been relatively ad hoc.271 
 
Compared with the other existing programs, the monitoring process of the Migrant Worker 
Convention offers the United States a unique opportunity to review its own policies on a regular 
basis and interact intensively with a group of experts that is tracking policies over time against a 
stable metric. As a party to the treaty, the United States would submit a report to the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers within one year of ratification, and every five 
years thereafter, respond to written questions, and participate in a question and answer session 
before the Committee. At the end of this process, the Committee would issue a report offering its 
conclusions and observations about U.S. compliance with the treaty. This exchange would allow 
Committee members to transmit the practices they have identified through interaction with other 
                                                
266 See id. at 15-16. 
267 See id. 
268 See id. at 21. 
269 See id. passim (Ten of the twenty initiatives named focus on sending country policies, and one lists no activities 
to date). 
270 See id. at 18-19. 
271 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association heard one complaint regarding the union rights of U.S. 
unauthorized workers, see Case No. 2227 (United States): Report in which the Committee Requests to Be Kept 
Informed of Developments, Complaints Against the Government of the United States presented by the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the Confederation of Mexican 
workers (CTM), in 332nd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, GB.288/7 (Part II), 288th Session 
(November 2003) (holding that the right to freedom of association requires that the United States reverse its policy 
that limit labor rights remedies for unauthorized immigrant workers), but the United States has not responded to the 
Committee’s requests that the United States provide follow-up progress reports. See Case No. 2227 (United States), 
in 335th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, GB.291/7, 291st Session (November 2004) 18, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb291/pdf/gb-7.pdf (expressing regret at the 
United States’ failure to report on its implementation of the 2003 ruling). The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has convened two ad hoc situation hearings on migrant workers in the United States, see Rebecca 
Smith, Human Rights at Home: Human Rights As an Organizing and Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker 
Communities, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 285, 308-309 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Human Rights at 
Home). Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Chapter II, Legal Bases and Activities of the IACHR During 
2006, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR 2006 PARA 19, available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/Chap.2.htm#124th, and a case against the United States is pending with the 
Inter-American Commission. See Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Undocumented Workers by 
the United States of America, brought by Sarah Paoletti, University of Pennsylvania Transnational Legal Clinic; 
Claudia Flores, ACLU Women’s Rights Project; Rebecca Smith, National Employment Law Project (Nov. 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file946_27232.pdf.  See also American Civil Liberties Union 
Press Release, Undocumented Workers Bring Plea for Non-Discrimination to Human Rights Body (Nov. 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/27235prs20061101.html. 
Draft Pending Publication with the New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 
Please cite as 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. ___ (2009) (publication pending). 
 
 48 
countries. The value added by this process will increase as more countries of employment ratify 
the convention and educate the Committee on their own best practices.  
 
The Committee reporting process272 mirrors to a large extent the monitoring mechanisms of the 
CAT, CERD and ICCPR, and over the past 15 years the U.S. government has developed a corps 
of officials who are experienced with liaising between the relevant agencies and the various UN 
committees in these reporting processes.273 The Migrant Worker process would, then, be familiar 
to the United States and, with a mere five –year periodicity, will not be burdensome. 
 
Although the Migrant Worker Committee could be a useful policy educator, it should be noted 
that the Executive has not been aggressive in implementing the recommendations arising from 
the proceedings of the other UN human rights committees. During the Bush Administration, the 
Department of State circulated the Concluding Observations issued by the committees, but did 
not feel obligated to make additional efforts to examine or alter policies in light of committee 
concerns.274 The view of that administration was that committee pronouncements are non-
binding.275 At the same time, President Clinton issued an executive order in 1998 creating an 
inter-agency body charged with implementing international human rights obligations, 276 creating 
an indirect mechanism for follow-up on Committee pronouncements. 
 
The reporting process itself would likely be the biggest benefit of ratification for policy 
advocates in the near-term. The three Committee-monitored Conventions to which the United 
States is a party are more general in nature than the Migrant Worker Convention. They also 
involve much more settled, Constitutional law than the ICMW. Debating the details of the 
temporary worker program with a Committee of experts may be more productive for the United 
States than, for example, discussing its widely criticized Guantánamo Bay policies with the 
Committee Against Torture. America’s guestworker program is a relatively more obscure 
program277 that would derive a concomitantly greater benefit from international monitoring. 
Each reporting cycle of the other U.S.-ratified human rights treaties sees increasingly robust 
participation by U.S. civil society.278 This pattern would likely play out with the Migrant Worker 
                                                
272 For a full description of the Committee process, see UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, arts. 72-77. 
273 See 2008 CERD State Department/NGO Meeting Notes, supra note 231. 
274 See id. 
275 See id.  
276 See Implementation of Human Rights Treaties, December 10, 1998, 63 FR 68991, Exec. Order No. 13107, 1998 
WL 34332076 (Pres.).  
277 A New York Times website search of articles using the term “guest worker program” turned up 249 results in the 
time period Jan 1, 2006 to Mar. 24, 2009.  A second New York Times website search for the term “Guantanamo 
Bay” turned up 1,136 results over an identical time period.  Results can be seen at 
http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?frow=0&n=10&srcht=a&query=guest+worker+program&srchst=nyt&hdlqu
ery=&bylquery=&daterange=period&mon1=01&day1=01&year1=2006&mon2=02&day2=10&year2=2009&submi
t.x=19&submit.y=12 and 
http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?frow=0&n=10&srcht=a&query=Guantanamo+Bay&srchst=nyt&hdlquery=
&bylquery=&daterange=period&mon1=01&day1=01&year1=2006&mon2=03&day2=24&year2=2009&submit.x=
42&submit.y=14.   
278 See, e.g., U.S. Human Rights Network, U.N. to Probe U.S. Human Rights Abuses: U.S. Non-Profits Submit 465-
Page “Shadow Report” Detailing Abuses at Home: Treatment of Immigrants, Katrina Survivors among Issues to be 
Reviewed (July 5, 2006), available at 
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Convention. The next section examines why domestic non-governmental advocates might value 
the Migrant Worker Convention and its monitoring process sufficiently to prioritize working 
toward ratification. 
D. Ratification of the Convention Would Benefit Civil Society 
Assessing a new human rights treaty is not merely a process of gauging the legal implications 
and political sensitivity of its provisions. These considerations are certainly critical to the 
inquiry, but they are not all encompassing. In order for review of a potential ratification to 
advance domestically, civil society must value it sufficiently to pursue ratification. Over the past 
fifteen years, various domestic migrant worker rights groups have made forays into international 
advocacy, airing concerns about domestic conditions with international bodies such as the Inter-
American Commission and Court, and the International Labour Organization. However, as this 
author has argued elsewhere, there has been little sustained effort to import international 
standards into domestic advocacy,279 and virtually no attention given to the Migrant Worker 
Convention.280 Working to ratify the Migrant Worker Convention would represent a meaningful 
shift in modality for U.S. migrant workers and their advocates, requiring that they articulate and 
justify a broad range of international standards for domestic audiences. It has already been noted 
above that the battery of reservations, understandings and declarations with which the United 
States is likely to limit ratification would rob the treaty of virtually any immediate 
enforceability.281 Given this reality, why should pro-migrant rights civil society expend limited 
resources advocating for ratification?282 
 
Depending on the restrictions on ratification, the Convention offers some substantive attractions 
to the migrant worker rights advocacy community: is somewhat more protective of family 
reunification for documented workers than U.S. law, it calls for due process in expulsion 
decisions, and it calls for equal workplace rights remedies for all migrant workers.283 These are 
important concerns for the migrant worker rights community. Furthermore, although many of the 
Convention’s protections have been read into other treaties via monitoring body interpretation,284 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/files/ushrn/images/linkfiles/Press_Release_UN_probe_US_human_rights_abuses.pdf; 
NGO Information relating to United States of America, US Human Rights Network, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/cerds72-ngos-usa.htm. 
279 Beth Lyon, Changing Tactics: Globalization and the U.S. Immigrant Worker Rights Movement, 13 UCLA J. 
INT'L. L. & FOREIGN AFF (forthcoming May 2009) [hereinafter Lyon, Changing Tactics]. There have been a few 
domestic efforts to import international norms in the United States, but compared with the work of other advocacy 
communities, these have been quite sparse. These “exceptions that prove the rule” include a group of claims lodged 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act on behalf of immigrant workers, a visit by the UN Rapporteur on Migrant Worker 
Rights and some efforts to implement NAALC recommendations. See id. 
280 See supra Section II.B. 
281 See supra Section II.D. 
282 Professor Meg Satterthwaite raised the resource concern in a 2005 article, arguing that “a dominant focus on the 
Migrant Workers’ Convention could be detrimental – not only because such a focus would siphon off needed energy 
more wisely placed elsewhere… but also because it would allow states to minimize the obligations they owe to 
women migrants under existing human rights law regardless of their decision to sign, ratify, or ignore this new 
treaty.” Satterthwaite, supra note 87, at 2. 
283 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, arts. 44, 50.  
284 See Satterthwaite, supra note 87, at 63. 
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the Convention details rights that have not yet been extended in other settings.285 Additionally, 
by its very structure, the Convention offers a comprehensive examination of the temporary 
worker experience that is lacking in any other treaty. Finally, as a general statement of the 
principle that migrant workers are rights-bearers, the Convention would fill a symbolic void in 
protection for this vulnerable population. The United States has not ratified the ILO conventions 
on migrant workers, and the NAFTA side agreement on labor has no substantive provisions; it 
requires only that governments enforce the laws already on the domestic books. 
 
Moreover, based on the experiences of the advocates working with the other UN treaty 
monitoring processes, the Migrant Worker Committee’s monitoring work would likely provide 
various advocacy opportunities for migrant workers. The first is that the process provides useful 
access to policymakers. The Department of State is the agency that is primarily responsible for 
reporting to the Committee, but, as noted above, other government agencies whose work 
implicates the treaty protections participate in meetings leading up to the process, and most send 
representatives to Geneva for the hearings.286 Non-governmental organizations have direct input 
into Committee proceedings, via written reports and meetings with Committee members.287 
Although Concluding Observations are not directly enforceable in court, advocates can use them 
for policy advocacy and for community organizing288 and empowering a group that is 
extraordinarily fearful and afraid of retaliation for asserting its rights.289 Secondly, interaction 
with and detailed pronouncements from the Migrant Worker Committee can invigorate a base 
that feels beset by post-9-11 enforcement measures, increased loss of life at the border, and legal 
setbacks such as Hoffman Plastic Compounds, failed immigration reform, and the loss of federal 
legal aid funding for undocumented immigrants.290 The U.S. migrant worker community has 
already shown itself to be interested in transmitting concerns to international monitors;291 in the 
Migrant Worker Committee, it would find an expert body that is fully focused on many of its 
issues. For these reasons, ratification of the Convention is worth exploring by U.S. civil society. 
E. Criticisms of the Convention 
                                                
285 See id. at 2. 
286 See Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Summary Record of the Presentation of States 
Parties in Conformance with Article 9 of the Convention, Fourth through Sixth Periodic Reports of the United 
States, CERD/C/SR.1853 (Feb. 28 2008) (in French; English translation not yet available) (summarizing the United 
States’ most recent presentation to the CERD Committee, in which multiple government officials made 
presentations); See 2008 CERD State Department/NGO Meeting Notes, supra note 225 (noting that at the meeting 
multiple government agencies mentioned they would be attending the hearings). 
287 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 74(4); Compilation of Rules of Procedure Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Addendum, HRI/GEN/3/Rev.1/Add.1 3 13 (May 7, 2004) (Rule 28, noting that the 
Committee “may invite” “national human rights institutions, non-governmental organizations, and other bodies” to 
submit “written information” relating to its work). 
288 See Samper Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879, 1895-96 (2007). 
See also Lyon, Tipping the Balance, supra note 200, at 217-241. 
289 See, e.g., Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Testimony of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus: National Employment Law Project: 
Hearing Before the United States Congress House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform: Adequacy of Labor Law Enforcement in New Orleans 10 (June 26, 2007), available at 
http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20070703121612.pdf. 
290 See Smith, Human Rights at Home, supra note 249, at 294-98; Lyon, Changing Tactics, supra note 279. 
291 See Lyon, Changing Tactics, supra note 279. 
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Each of the core UN human rights treaties that the United States has considered ratifying, 
including the three that the United States has actually ratified, has been the subject of criticism. 
Some of the criticisms are generic, having been raised in the context of virtually every 
ratification debate. Examples of these generic criticisms include potential threats to U.S. 
sovereignty,292 or the possibility that the treaty will hamper the United States by requiring 
bureaucratic monitoring procedures.293 Each ratification process has also surfaced treaty-specific 
criticisms, often the concern that United States is actually more protective of human rights than 
some passages of the treaty in question, and, conversely, that ratifying a treaty will require 
changes in a particularly sensitive area of domestic law.294 The following section considers 
criticisms specific to the Migrant Worker Convention, including its place within the broader 
human rights regime, its scope of coverage, and technical issues such as the treaty’s complexity 
and its provisions regarding permissible limitations on ratification. In keeping with the present 
article’s focus on the Convention’s prospects in the United States, the following section 
highlights U.S.-based articles, either written with a view to the U.S. context or simply produced 
by U.S. commentators. In this section I agree with some of these concerns, but conclude that they 
are not significant enough to warrant disengagement with the Convention. 
 
1. Substantive Criticisms 
 
The Migrant Worker Convention is the subject of various substantive criticisms regarding the 
scope and coverage of its provisions. Many of these criticisms argue that the Convention is over-
inclusive. Commentary faults the Convention for making mention of trafficking, for leaving 
vague the quantum and timing of work that might qualify a worker for protection, for 
overlapping with other treaties, in particular the Refugee Convention. Perhaps most significant of 
the over-inclusion concerns relates to the controversial decision to provide explicit coverage for 
unauthorized workers and their undocumented family members in the Convention. The following 
discussion points out that most, though not all, of these concerns are raised in the 1991 article by 
Professors Nafziger and Bartel, and intervening events have altered, with regard to at least some 
of these issues, the analytical landscape. The Convention is also the subject of under-inclusion 
criticisms. The critiqued omissions include 1) the Convention’s notable failure to provide a right 
to regularization of status for long-term undocumented residents and workers, 2) the 
Convention’s failure to ensure that workers who assert their rights under the Convention will not 
face deportation as a result of that assertion; and 3) the Convention’s failure to address the 
unique and pressing concerns of women migrant workers. 
a. Over-Inclusiveness Concerns 
 
Over-inclusiveness concerns center on four areas of protection. These are the fact that the 
Convention addresses the issue of trafficking, the fact that it leaves vague the quantum and 
timing of work needed to trigger treaty protection, and the Convention’s protections that overlap 
                                                
292 Kaufman, supra note 56, at 204-205. 
293 John R. Bolton and John Yoo, Restore the Senate’s Treaty Power, N.Y. Times (Jan. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/05/opinion/05bolton.html?_r=1. 
294 See Kaufman, supra note 56, at 129.  
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with existing instruments. Most significantly, the Convention’s explicit inclusion of protections 
for unauthorized workers and undocumented family members is most likely to be controversial 
in any ratification debate. The following discussion addresses the first three of these concerns in 
turn, concluding that the Convention appropriately covers these areas. The question of the 
Convention’s treatment of unauthorized workers is then addressed in the following section. 
1. Trafficking 
 
In their 1991 article, Professors Nafziger and Bartel objected to the Convention’s preambular 
statement that “appropriate action should be encouraged in order to prevent and eliminate 
clandestine movements and trafficking in migrant workers, while at the same time assuring the 
protection of their fundamental human rights.”295 The authors argued that a “separate instrument 
to address the problem of trafficking in undocumented aliens, that is, workers in an irregular 
situation, is preferable to the incorporation of anti-trafficking provisions in a more general 
human rights instrument, so as to stigmatize those aliens. The lot of undocumented workers is 
bad enough without enlisting a new corpus of human rights law, in effect, against them.”296  
 
I agree that a separate anti-trafficking enforcement treaty was warranted, and indeed in the year 
2000 the Economic and Social Council promulgated The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.297 The United States ratified the 
Protocol in 2005.298 This instrument involves significantly different goals than the Migrant 
Worker Convention, although the populations it is intended to assist, and in some cases intended 
to punish, certainly overlap.  
 
However, I do not agree that including the issue of trafficking in the Migrant Worker Convention 
was inappropriate. Protecting migrant worker rights and reducing human trafficking are mutually 
supportive efforts, and, properly pursued, anti-trafficking enforcement should not be an act of 
stigmatization. Anti-trafficking enforcement can and should be protective of victims of 
trafficking. For example, Article 7 of the anti-trafficking Protocol requires States Parties to 
“consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in 
persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently…giv(ing) appropriate 
                                                
295 See id. Preamble. 
296 Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 788. 
297 See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, available at (last visited 
February 10, 2008). 
298 See Status as at: 06-03-2009 10:23:15 EDT: Chapter XVIII: Penal Matters: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15, November 2000, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=376&chapter=18&lang=en (visited March 6, 
2009). In 2005 the United States also ratified a parallel protocol on human smuggling. See Status as at: 06-03-2009 
10:23:15 EDT: Chapter XVIII: Penal Matters: 12 .b Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=377&chapter=18&lang=en (visited March 6, 
2009). 
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consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors.”299 This type of policy, which is 
reflected in U.S. law,300 is in keeping with the Migrant Worker Convention’s protection focus.  
 
In addition, it is important to note that not all “workers in an irregular situation” are trafficked – 
in the United States, for example, estimates are that fewer than 20,000 people are trafficked into 
this country each year,301 as compared with 7.2 million unauthorized workers.302 The vast 
majority of undocumented immigrants were smuggled at their own request,303 and roughly thirty 
percent entered legally and overstayed or otherwise violated their status.304 The two groups – 
unauthorized workers and trafficking victims - should not be conflated, but their shared need for 
protection is appropriately addressed through the Migrant Worker Convention’s preambular call 
for anti-trafficking enforcement.305 
2. Quantum and Timing of Work 
 
Professors Nafziger and Bartel also object to the Convention’s Article 2 definition of a migrant 
worker because it suggests that past labor alone can qualify one for Convention protection. 
Professors Nafziger and Bartel further point out that Article 2 leaves open how much 
remunerated activity is necessary to qualify as a migrant worker.306 Neither of these issues was 
controversial at the drafting stage, and neither conflicts with principles of U.S. employment law. 
 
Article 2.1 of the Migrant Worker Convention states that “[t]he term "migrant worker" refers to a 
person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State 
of which he or she is not a national.” The concern is that, under this definition, which took nearly 
the entire decade of negotiation to iron out,307 individuals who no longer work, or who worked 
for very brief periods of time, might be accorded protection under the Convention. This concern 
                                                
299 See id. art. 7(1)-(2). 
300 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2009) (establishing a visa category for “victim[s] of a severe form of 
trafficking”). 
301 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF U.S. ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
2004 (June 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/wetf/us_assessment_2004.pdf (estimating that 
between 14,500 and 17,500 people are trafficked annually into the United States). 
302 See PEW UNDOCUMENTED WORKER COUNT, supra note 178. 
303 See JAMES LOUCKY ET AL., IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA TODAY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 335 (2006) (noting that 75% 
of undocumented immigrants entering from Latin America are smuggled); see also Ko-lin Chin, Smuggled Chinese 
(1999) (noting a figure of 50,000 Chinese nationals smuggled into the United States per year). 
304 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OVERSTAY TRACKING: A KEY COMPONENT OF  
HOMELAND SECURITY AND A LAYERED DEFENSE 10 (May 2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0482.pdf. 
305 Similarly, I disagree with the argument that the Migrant Worker Convention should not have included a call for 
enforcement measures. See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 784. It is true that a climate of enforcement chills 
rights and brings inevitable abuses. At the same time, employer sanctions may move political will toward 
legalization, and a treaty including rights for undocumented migrant workers without endorsing enforcement would 
be even more politically un-saleable than the Migrant Worker Convention has heretofore proven to be. 
306 See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 786. 
307 See Juhani Lönnroth, The International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families in the Context of International Migration Policies: An Analysis of Ten Years of Negotiation, XXV INT’L 
MIGRATION REV., 710, 715, 719, 720, 723, 731 (1991) (discussing the protracted negotiations about what migrant 
workers would be included for protection in the Convention). 
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was apparently not aired during the treaty negotiations308 and likely does not impinge on U.S. 
law. For example, many of the provisions of the Convention relate to rights that logically survive 
termination of the employment relationship under U.S. law, such as the right to remuneration and 
overtime for work performed,309 due process in deportation310 (which typically follows 
termination of the employment relationship) or protection for temporary workers who have lost 
their jobs.311 Therefore, inclusion of former workers in the Convention is appropriate. Moreover, 
the original decision to include family members of migrant workers in the Convention likely 
means that many former workers would fall within the treaty’s mandate even if they were no 
longer considered migrant workers. 
 
The second concern about Article 2.1, regarding its failure to establish a minimum period of 
employment, does resonate slightly with U.S. law. Some labor and employment regimes require 
minimum periods of work to trigger eligibility, for example some workers’ compensation 
schemes312 and social security.313 These exclusions were created to lessen the financial burden on 
employers and ensure sufficient pay-ins to fund the system.314 However, these domestic law 
considerations are misplaced in the context of the Convention. Protection under the Convention 
should be triggered by any period of work because, by definition, even a short period of work 
was preceded by a migration experience and will likely be followed by a second migration 
experience. It seems unlikely that a foreign national would immigrate into the United States, and 
then work for one day in order to claim the benefits of the Convention’s protection. The 
Convention would provide such an individual no right to legalize and likely no other 
immigration benefit.315 A worker who worked even very briefly in the United States should have 
the baseline protections that the Convention offers. Moreover, unlike the Social Security system, 
the Convention does not look to its beneficiaries to finance its operations.  
3. Overlap with other Treaties 
 
Professors Nafziger and Bartel argued that the section of the Migrant Worker Convention 
protecting all workers and family members mirrors existing rights, and “may obfuscate or 
obscure the enforcement of both the Convention and corresponding human rights instruments 
                                                
308 See id. passim (discussing various debates about what migrant workers would be covered, but not mentioning the 
question of previously employed migrant workers or briefly employed migrants). 
309 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 25.1 & 25.1(a).  
310 See id. art. 22.  
311 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 49. 
312 See JOSEPH W. LITTLE, ET AL., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th Edition 2004) 110-111 
(noting that some state workers’ compensation exclude from coverage “casual employees” whose employment is 
“sufficiently transitory or temporary.”). Excluding a worker from coverage solely on the basis of the temporariness 
of the work performed is, however, likely a minority rule as among the states. See JACK B. HOOD, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYEE PROTECTION LAWS IN A NUTSHELL 43 (1999).  
313 See 42 U.S.C. 402, 414(a) (2009); 20 C.F.R. § 404.120(a) & § 404.310 (2009) (stating that in order to qualify for 
old-age social security benefits, a recipient must have accrued six quarters of work). 
314 See Social Security Administration, Legislative History: 1939 Amendments, available at 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html (stating that “Under an insurance program, to be 
eligible for benefits a worker should have made some minimum contribution.”) 
315 See supra Sections III.2.a & III.2.d.  
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that are designed to protect everyone, including migrant workers.”316 The United States raised 
this concern in its preliminary statement to the Working Group in 1980.317 However, the United 
States did not raise this concern again. Indeed, in the next year’s 1981 round of Working Group 
sessions, the United States supported a proposal that the Convention include a separate listing of 
rights owed to undocumented migrants.318  
 
The contention that the Convention provision mirrors provisions of pre-existing treaties is 
certainly correct. In fact, in their article raising the overlap concern, Professors Nafziger and 
Bartel demonstrate the parallel nature of 23 protections between the ICMW and the ICCPR.319 
However, the existence of overlap between the Migrant Worker Convention’s protections for all 
workers and family members and other human rights treaties would not hinder the United States’ 
treaty compliance. To the extent that the specific language of analogous treaty provisions differs, 
presumably countries that have ratified both would need to ensure that their domestic laws 
conform to whichever of the two standards is most rights-protective. Should treaty monitoring 
committee interpretations of analogous provisions differ, the U.S. government would simply be 
presented with the opportunity to urge the interpretation that is in this country’s best interests, 
much as do advocates and lower courts when confronted with a split between the U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeal. 
 
The human rights treaties currently binding on the United States already contain overlapping 
language. For example, as Professors Nafziger and Bartel’s research demonstrates, Article 5 of 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Race Discrimination (CERD) 
also contains an extensive set of fundamental rights that overlap with the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).320 The United States has ratified both of these treaties. A 
survey of the United States’ country reports to those bodies as well as the relevant Concluding 
Observations does not reveal any problems raised by overlapping protections, wording 
differences or conflicting interpretations.321 Nor has the concern about overlapping language 
been raised against ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention in the non-ratifying countries 
that recently published reports on their assessments of the treaty.322 
                                                
316 Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 787. 
317 See November 1980 Working Group Report, supra note 27, Annex VI, para. 3 (preliminary written proposal of 
the United States emphasizing “[t]he importance of avoiding overlap or conflict with existing multilateral, regional 
and bilateral instruments or arrangements”). Note that, after making this point in the first year of negotiations, the 
United States did not raise this concern again. in the next year’s (1981) round of Working Group sessions, the 
United States supported a proposal that the Convention include a separate listing of rights owed to undocumented 
migrants. See November 1981 Working Group Report, supra note 27, para. 30.  
318 See November 1981 Working Group Report, supra note 27, para. 30. 
319 See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 789-799, Appendix.  
320 See id. (noting that CERD Article 5 protections, such as the right to leave and enter one’s state of origin and the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, overlap with ICCPR articles 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, 22, 25, and 26). 
The CERD can be found at Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by 
General Assembly on 21 December, 1965, GA Res 20/2106; in force 4 January, 1969 [hereinafter CERD]. 
321 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: United States of America: Addendum: Comments by the Government of the United States of America on 
the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1 (February 12, 
2008). 
322 CANADIAN ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY, supra note 11, passim; EUROPEAN ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY, supra 
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It may be that the Convention will ultimately be abandoned because it simply cannot garner the 
country of employment ratifications to make it worth the expense to monitor. The Convention 
should not, however, be replaced with protocols or even amendments to existing treaties of 
broader application, as Professors Nafziger and Bartel suggest.323 The utility of a single 
Convention focusing on this population is that it allows a group of specialists to focus on all the 
issues relating to an important and challenging policy concern such as immigrant workers. In 
addition, the United Nations has already determined that population-specific human rights 
treaties are appropriate, as evidenced by the Women’s Convention, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and the Convention on Persons with Disabilities. Subsets of broader population-
focused treaties have been addressed through protocols, for example the Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child dealing with the human rights of child soldiers,324 but that 
is an approach would be quite distinct from what Professors Nafziger and Bartel suggestion, 
which would amount to adding a protocol to one or more treaties of broad application for a large 
population such as migrant workers. Nor can the many challenges faced by migrant workers be 
addressed merely through interpretation of broader documents. 
 
Professors Nafziger and Bartel also raised a specific concern about the Migrant Worker 
Convention’s interrelationship with the international treaties that protect refugees. They argued 
that “distinguishing workers, as defined, from other aliens makes sense only if the distinction 
addresses the special problems of workers. Unfortunately, too many provisions in the 
Convention extend protections unrelated to the distinct status and plight of migrant workers 
                                                                                                                                                       
note 38, passim; ASIA ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY, supra note 39, passim; Z.H. A. ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA, THE 
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS AND 
PERSPECTIVES OF JOINING THE 1990 UN CONVENTION, in UNESCO Series of Country Reports on the Ratification of 
the UN Convention on Migrants, SHS/2004/MC/6 REV (July 1, 2004), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139533E.pdf (assessing the treaty for non-ratifying countries: 
Armenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, and for 
ratifying countries: Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan) [hereinafter EASTERN EUROPEAN ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY]; 
KHADIJA ELMADMAD, ED., LES MIGRANTS ET LEURS DROITS AU MAGHREB: AVEC UNE RÉFERÉNCE SPÉCIALE À LA 
CONVENTION SUR LA PROTECTION DS DROITS DE TOUS LES TRAVAILLEURS MIGRANTS (2004), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/files/6407/11400026311LIVRE.pdf/LIVRE.pdf (assessing the Convention for non-
ratifying country Tunisia and ratifying countries Algeria and Morocco) [hereinafter NORTH AFRICAN ASSESSMENT 
OF THE TREATY]; ROBYN IREDALE, IDENTIFICATION OF THE OBSTACLES TO THE SIGNING AND RATIFICATION OF THE 
UN CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL MIGRANT WORKERS 1990: CHINA (Asia Pacific 
Migration Research Network Working Paper No. 16) (December 2005), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=9165&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
[hereinafter CHINA ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY]; OLAIDE A. ADEDOKUN, THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS AND 
MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES, in UNESCO Series of Country Reports on the Ratification of the UN Convention on 
Migrants, SHS/2003/MC/7 (October 13, 2003), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139534E.pdf [hereinafter NIGERIAN ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY]; 
BABACAR SALL, MIGRATION DE TRAVAIL ET PROTECTION DES DROITS HUMAINS EN AFRIQUE: LES OBSTACLES À LA 
CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE SUR LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DE TOUS LES TRVAILLEURS MIGRANTS ET DES MEMBRES 
DE LEUR FAMILLE EN AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE (Études UNESCO sur les migrations – no. 2, 2007), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001525/152536F.pdf [hereinafter CAMEROON ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY]. 
323 See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 788. 
324 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 12 February 2002. 
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beyond those enjoyed by refugees.”325 The authors offer as an example the fact that the Refugee 
Convention provides national treatment in the right to work.326 However, this provision and the 
Migrant Worker Convention provisions on employment are not analogous. Refugee Convention 
Article 17 is a direct intervention into migration law, because it requires that states parties allow 
refugees to work legally. The refugee convention goes far beyond the migrant worker 
convention, which explicitly does not purport to effect basic immigration quotas and allocations, 
including the decision about which immigrants may legally work. The most the Migrant Worker 
Convention does is to inject humanitarian factors for consideration into expulsion and visa 
extension decisions,327 and require States Parties to offer portability of temporary visas from one 
employer to another.328 Thus, the Migrant Worker Convention, in the example cited, does not go 
beyond the Refugee Convention.  
b. Protection for Unauthorized Workers and Undocumented Family Members 
 
As noted above, most of the treaty’s substantive provisions are divided between general 
protections for all migrant workers, including unauthorized workers, and a more limited subset 
of rights accorded only to authorized workers. Various concerns have been raised about the 
Convention’s treatment of unauthorized workers and undocumented family members. Most 
fundamentally, the drafters’ decision to extend protections to unauthorized workers is likely to be 
viewed as controversial in the American context as a political matter, although the academic 
discussion appears to focus its concern not on the fact that these workers are given protection, 
but on how the Convention is structured to provide that protection.   
 
The political concern relating to the Convention’s explicit protections for unauthorized workers 
is the controversiality of protecting people who have, by definition, violated immigration law. 
Public opinion around the world is negative about undocumented immigrants,329 and during the 
early discussions of the Migrant Worker Convention, the negotiators debated whether to place 
unauthorized workers within the ambit of the Convention and which rights to accord them.330 
The decision was taken, however, to follow the precedent set by the more recent of two ILO 
Conventions on Migrant Workers, ILO Convention 143, which preceded and informed the 
Migrant Worker Convention, and includes protections for unauthorized workers.331 Additionally, 
                                                
325 See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 787. The 1991 article also argues that the ICMW extends rights beyond 
those extended to other aliens and to citizens, see id., but did not provide examples. 
326 See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 787 n. 72. 
327 See supra Section III.B.2.d. 
328 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, arts. 51-52.  
329 See, e.g., John Judis, Phantom Menace: The Psychology Behind America's Immigration Hysteria, The New 
Republic, (Feb. 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19878; Jonathan Storm, Ed., The Perfect 
Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa (The Southern African Migration Project 
Migration Policy Series No. 50, 2008), available at 
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/policyseries/Acrobat50.pdf; Antonello Nusca, More 
Immigrants Feeling Unwelcome in Europe, USA Today (June 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-06-09-Rome_N.htm. 
330 See Bosniak, supra note 18, at 325-26.,  
331 See ILO 143, supra note 14, arts. 1 & 9. Note that the ILO also issued a supplementary recommendation on 
migrant workers in 1975, which again called for worker rights protections for unauthorized workers, to include 
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the 1985 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not 
Citizens of the Countries in Which They Live, after “factious debates”332 does include 
protections for undocumented immigrants.333 The decision to include unauthorized workers in 
the Migrant Worker Convention was, however, a departure from the European precedent, which 
concluded a regional treaty in 1977 that explicitly excludes unauthorized workers.334 In 2007, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued the ASEAN Declaration on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, which, though much shorter and 
more general than a treaty, nonetheless explicitly offers some limited protection to unauthorized 
workers.335 Moreover, in the years since the Migrant Worker Convention negotiators grappled 
with the tension between human rights and political reality, the legal rights of unauthorized 
workers have gained some footholds in international law. The UN Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination has interpreted the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination to provide equal workplace rights for unauthorized workers.336 The Inter-
American Court has issued an advisory opinion establishing the same principle through the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man right to equality of treatment.337 The 
Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organization has also held 
that the right to freedom of association applied equally in all respects, including the available 
legal remedies, to unauthorized workers.338 
 
There seems to be little doubt that by offering protection to unauthorized workers, the framers of 
the treaty risked what has been to date the result; most countries of migrant employment have 
shunned the treaty. However, the inclusion has been supported by subsequent legal 
                                                                                                                                                       
equal workplace rights. See Recommendation concerning Migrant Workers, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R151. 
332 See Bosniak, supra note 18, at 314. 
333 See UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the 
Country in Which They Live : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 13 December 
1985. A/RES/40/144. Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f00864.html 5-10; see also Bosniak, supra note 18, at 314. 
334 See European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Art. 1.1, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/093.htm (defining a migrant worker as “a national of a 
Contracting Party who has been authorised by another Contracting Party to reside in its territory in order to take up 
paid employment”). 
335 See ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers General Principle 1 
available at http://www.12thaseansummit.org.ph/innertemplate3.asp?category=docs&docid=23. 
336 See U.N. COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, GENERAL RECOMMENDATION NO.30: 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON CITIZENS, Jan. 10, 2004, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/e3980a673769e229c1256f8d0057cd3d?Opendocument (stating that 
unauthorized workers “are entitled to the enjoyment of labour and employment rights, including the freedom of 
assembly and association, once an employment relationship has been initiated until it is terminated.”) 
337 See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, OC-18/03 Op. Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Sept. 17, 
2003) [hereinafter OC-18], available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf.  This article 
refers to the case as OC-18, the designated acronym for opinión consultiva, the Spanish translation of the term 
"advisory opinion." "OC" is generally used to refer to these cases in the Inter-American system whether the decision 
referenced is in English, Spanish, or Portuguese.  For the purposes of this article, the author used an English 
translation. See also Beth Lyon, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Defines Unauthorized Migrant 
Workers’ Rights for the Hemisphere: A Comment on Advisory Opinion 18, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547, 
558 (2004). 
338 See supra note (271). 
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developments, and continues to be justified by the humanitarian situation of these workers. 
Undocumented status tracks numerous other indicia of vulnerability, such as race, poverty, poor-
country origin, trauma survivorship, and lower education level,339 underscoring the need for 
careful attention to baseline rights. So long as international law is unwilling to disturb national 
sovereignty with respect to regulating the availability of brown-collar visas, international law 
should acknowledge the resulting hierarchies. Because undocumented immigrants are so 
vulnerable, the Convention’s explicit application of basic rights to them provides the Migrant 
Worker Committee with a more effective mandate for exploring and shoring up their situation 
within each State Party.  
 
A related concern relates to the structure of the Convention’s protections for unauthorized 
workers. According to Professors Nafziger and Bartel, “providing one set of rights for all 
migrant workers and another for documented workers alone poses enormous problems of 
interpretation and implementation. The distinction may also threaten principles of humanity and 
justice.”340 Moreover, the Convention’s structure has a historical antecedent: ILO 143 is also 
structured to include one set of rights for all migrant workers and additional rights for authorized 
workers.341 Although the resulting protection scheme may seem complicated, and also may seem 
to endorse the underlying hierarchies in a way that may be philosophically disturbing, the dualist 
nature of the Convention is a compromise that achieves the treaty’s goals as efficiently as 
possible given the existence of the strong documented-undocumented distinction in most 
workplaces. As argued above, a treaty that purports to protect migrant workers without providing 
protections to the unauthorized would fail both classes of worker. Moreover, the Migrant Worker 
Convention does not only distinguish between authorized and unauthorized workers. The 
Convention also breaks out brief particularized protections for other sub-classes of migrant 
worker, for example frontier workers342 and seasonal workers,343 much as the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women addresses particular protections to rural 
women.344 
 
A third concern regarding the Convention’s treatment of unauthorized workers involves the 
protections that are omitted. Although the Convention broke new ground in establishing rights 
for the unauthorized, including many protections that remain unique to the Convention,345 some 
omissions have been the subject of criticism. The first and most glaring is the lack of any right to 
legalization of status for long-term residents. As Professor Bosniak states, despite its 
groundbreaking protections, the Convention is “a staunch manifesto in support of state territorial 
                                                
339 See Constance de la Vega and Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use Applicable International 
Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Rights in the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE 
& POVERTY L. J. 35, 36-45 (2005); See Jorge A. Bustamante, A Dialectical Understanding of the Vulnerability of 
International Migrants, in HERNAN VERA AND JOE R. FEAGIN, EDS., HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC RELATIONS 161, passim (Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research 2007). 
340 Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 787. Professors Nafziger and Bartel did not elaborate on the problems the 
distinction would cause. See id. 
341 See ILO 143, supra note 14, passim. 
342 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 58. 
343 See id. art. 59. 
344 See CEDAW, supra note 7, art. 14. 
345 See Bosniak, supra note 18, at 334-45. 
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sovereignty.”346 The lack of opportunities for legal brown-collar migration is, arguably, the 
underlying cause of a host of many human rights violations that undocumented immigrants 
experience. However, as Professor Bosniak concedes, including such a right to legalize would 
have been enormously politically difficult.347 Most significantly, Professor Bosniak objects to the 
Convention’s failure to guarantee that undocumented individuals who assert their rights under 
the Convention will not be then placed into deportation proceedings as a result of the 
assertion.348 I agree that such a provision would have been an important and appropriate 
resolution of the rights-sovereignty tension between that the Migrant Worker Convention so 
starkly embodies. 
c. Gender and Migrant Workers  
 
Professor Meg Satterthwaite critiques the Convention for its silence on the issue of gender and 
migrant worker rights. She rightly points out that that the Convention fails to provide any explicit 
protection from the gendered forms of exploitation and violence that migrant worker face.349 
Professor Satterthwaite also compares the robust ratification record of the six other longstanding 
UN human rights treaties with the slow pace of the Migrant Worker Convention.350 Based on 
these observations, Professor Satterthwaite rightly argues that ratification of the Convention 
should not be the sole focus for governments and advocates concerned about developing the law 
on this issue. Professor Meg Satterthwaite argues that, rather than focusing exclusively on 
ratification efforts for the Convention, migrant worker advocates should direct their energies 
toward ensuring that more widely ratified human rights treaties are interpreted so as to extend 
protection both to migrant workers in general, and to women migrant workers in particular.351 
The monitoring process of the Migrant Worker Convention promises a concentrated examination 
of this community that Professor Satterthwaite’s approach cannot provide, but if the Convention 
is not more widely ratified, this benefit will be limited. Moreover, Professor Satterthwaite’s 
intervention clearly points up the age of the Convention – drafted today, it would doubtless 
include explicit provisions on women migrant workers. This is not an uncommon problem; most 
of the other major human rights treaties are older than the Migrant Worker Convention, and 
contemporary concerns can be incorporated through the use of protocols and interpretations. 
Professor Satterthwaite’s argument also underscores the lack of civil society advocacy resources 
discussed above. 
 
2. Technical Criticisms: Lack of a Reciprocity Clause, Prohibition on 
Excluding Categories of Immigrants, and Complexity 
 
Professors Nafziger and Bartel raise several technical issues about the Migrant Worker 
Convention. Two of these concerns relate to the Convention’s enforcement scheme. First, the 
                                                
346 See id. at 316, 339. 
347 See id. at 338. 
348 See id. at 336. 
349 See Satterthwaite, supra note 87, at 2-4. 
350 See id. at 2. 
351 See id., passim. 
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authors point out that the Convention lacks a reciprocity clause, an omission that “may inhibit 
ratification and accession to the convention.”352 Second, the authors argue that the treaty’s 
injunction forbidding governments to exclude application of entire treaty sections, or to exclude 
entire migrant categories from protection - creates a danger of “complicated sub-regimes” of 
exclusions and obligations. The concern is that if only small subsets of exclusions are permitted 
will needlessly complicate Convention member states’ map of obligations. The following section 
argues that these features of the Convention are entirely appropriate to human rights treaties in 
general and to the Convention in particular. Finally, the 1991 article lodges a concern about the 
complexity of the treaty. As argued in this section, although I agree that these observations are 
factually correct, I do not feel that they should preclude ratification of the Convention. 
a. Reciprocity 
 
The 1991 article argues that the lack of a reciprocity clause weakens the Convention. A 
reciprocity clause is a mechanism that allows states parties to avoid their own treaty obligations 
when other states parties breach the treaty.353 This lack may well be a weakness, but it should 
not, as the authors of the 1991 article suggest, prevent governments from ratifying the 
Convention. International law expert Liesbeth Lijnzaad argues that the general failure of human 
rights treaty states parties to protest treaty reservations taken by other states parties is a failure of 
reciprocity.354  However, this is an omission that the Convention shares with other human rights 
treaties.355 None of the other eight “core” UN human rights treaty includes such a clause. In fact, 
Japan was criticized when it ratified the Convention Against Torture with a reservation imposing 
a reciprocity requirement.356 Dr. Lijnzaad maintains that human rights treaties “have a validity 
well beyond the bounds of reciprocity:”357 
 
The fact that the actual beneficiaries of the conventions are civilians rather than 
states, together with the objective nature of the rights might suggest that no 
exchange of benefits between the ratifying states took place. This is incorrect. The 
most essential benefit is the fact that human rights will be regulated at the 
international level….There are often other benefits involved in negotiating and 
acceding to a human rights treaty. These will not be retributions in the shape of 
favourable provisions in an international legal instrument, but may take the form 
of extra-legal remunerations, such as an improvement of the States’ international 
standing, the proof of being a respectable member of the international 
community.358 
 
                                                
352 See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 786. 
353 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 801 (1987). 
354 LIJNZAAD, supra note 95, AT 112. 
355 See id. at 110-111.  
356 See id. at 111. The Convention Against Torture can be found at Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
357 See id. 
358 See id. 
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Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically exempts “provisions 
relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character” 
from its general rule permitting parties to a treaty from terminating or suspending the operation 
of a treaty as a result of a material breach by another party.359 The Vienna Convention’s travaux 
préparatoires suggest that “treaties of a humanitarian character” includes human rights 
treaties.360 Finally, the U.S. Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations takes the position that a 
government (“State A”) may not take countermeasures against another government (“State B”) 
by suspending either human rights norms or minimum protections provided to the aliens of State 
B.361 Given these multiple protections against unilateral suspension of human rights treaty 
provisions, in particular in the treatment of aliens, the Migrant Worker Convention’s lack of a 
reciprocity clause is appropriate to the treaty’s status as a human rights treaty.  
b. Non-Exclusion of Worker Categories 
 
Article 88 of the Migrant Worker Convention forbids states that are joining the Convention to 
“exclude the application of any Part of it, or…[to] exclude any particular category of migrant 
workers from its application.”362 This provision is significant because it prevents ratifying states 
from excluding undocumented immigrants from protection. The authors of the 1991 article 
criticize this provision, arguing that Article 88 raises a concern about “complicated sub-regimes 
of international obligations among States Parties because states parties can exclude application of 
individual provisions but can’t exclude the application of an entire ‘Part.’”363 This criticism is 
misplaced because it does not account for the fact that none of the other major UN human rights 
treaties forbids states parties from excluding application of individual provisions or small 
clusters of rights.364 The concern that complicated sub-regimes will arise does not seem to be 
bearing itself out, at least based on the limited record of the 41 ratifications to date. Only 28 
limitations on ratification have been registered to date,365 creating a ratio of ratification-to-
exclusions that is not significantly different from the three “core” UN human rights treaties that 
the United States has ratified.366 While this rate of exclusions likely arises in part from the fact 
that countries of origin have ratified the Convention, each of the ratifying countries does host 
some migrants, and even the two states parties that host significant numbers of migrants – 
                                                
359 See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60.5, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
360 See RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 169-170 (2002) (citing United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, II, at 112 (remark by Switzerland). 
361 See id. at 218 (citing Restatement III, 41 para. 711 comment q and para. 905 and reporter’s note 2). 
362 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, art. 88. Note that by its own terms the Convention does not 
protect various categories of migrants: 1) individuals working for international agencies or performing various 
diplomatic functions; 2) foreign investors; 3) refugees; 4) stateless persons; 5) students and trainees; and 6) seafarers 
and offshore workers who have not been admitted for employment. See id. at art. 3. 
363 See Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 785. 
364 See ICCPR, supra note 109, passim; Convention Against Torture, supra note 356, passim; CERD, supra note 
320, passim; ICESCR, supra note 56, passim; CRC, supra note 85, passim; CEDAW, supra note 7, passim; 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/61/106 passim (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]. 
365 See ICMW Ratification Record, supra note 29. 
366 Compare CAT Ratification Record, supra note 43, passim (reflecting 146 states parties and 71 reservations, 
understandings and declarations) with ICMW Ratification Record, supra note 29, passim (reflecting 41 states parties 
and 28 reservations). 
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Turkey and Mexico – registered relatively fewer restrictions on ratification367 than the United 
States has in its ratification of other treaties.368 Moreover, the greater length of the Convention 
would seem to lead to more exclusions, a prediction that has not been borne out. However, until 
more countries of employment analyze the Convention, it will not be clear which provisions, if 
any, wealthy countries are likely to eschew. In any event, it is not clear that the inability to avoid 
responsibility for entire parts of the Convention, or to exclude entire categories of migrants, 
would lead governments to exclude a patchwork of provisions. 
 
Indeed, the more likely risk of Article 88 is the possibility that it will deter governments from 
ratifying the Convention at all, because they cannot exclude the category of undocumented 
workers from protection. However, as Professor Linda Bosniak argues, Article 88 “goes a long 
way to protecting the purpose and integrity of the instrument.”369 In sum, having decided that 
protecting all migrant workers is a core value of the Convention, requiring that ratifying 
countries sign onto at least some protections for the unauthorized ensures that the document 
stands true to the consensus reached by its negotiators. 
c. Complexity 
 
Professors Nafziger and Bartel argue that the Convention is a complex document370 that should 
be replaced by efforts at clarifying that existing rights apply to migrants and a “separate, concise 
instrument” containing “special protections that take account of the unique status and problems 
of migrant workers.”371 The Migrant Worker treaty is certainly more specialized than human 
rights treaties of more general application, and it is lengthy. Its 71 substantive provisions 
significantly exceed the other major UN human rights conventions.372 However, a longer and 
more specialized document does not mean a more burdensome compliance process. Indeed, as 
the first 34 provisions aimed at all migrant workers substantially mirror existing treaty 
obligations,373 in order to clarify protection for unauthorized workers – a major reason is why the 
document is so lengthy – a great deal of the reporting would be synergistic with the U.S. 
government’s ongoing compliance work. Moreover, because much of the Convention involves 
one government regime – the temporary worker program374 - a relatively discrete number of 
                                                
367 See ICMW Ratification Record, supra note 29 (showing that Turkey registered one reservation and four 
declarations, and that Mexico registered only one limiting reservation). Note also that Mexico took the unusual step 
of consenting to the Migrant Worker Committee’s jurisdiction over individual complaints. See id.  
368 See ICCPR Ratification Record, supra note 43 (showing that the United States registered five reservations, five 
understandings, and three declarations); CERD Ratification Record, supra note 43 (showing that the United States 
registered three reservations, one understanding and one declaration); CAT Ratification Record, supra note 43 
(showing that the United States registered two reservations, five understandings (one with multiple sub-parts) and 
one declaration). 
369 Bosniak, supra note 18, at 339. 
370 Nafziger & Bartel, supra note 87, at 784. 
371 Id. at 788. 
372 See ICCPR, supra note 109 (27 substantive provisions); Convention Against Torture, supra note 356 (16 
substantive provisions); CERD, supra note 320 (7 substantive provisions); ICESCR, supra note 56 (15 substantive 
provisions); CRC, supra note 85 (45 substantive provisions); CEDAW, supra note 7 (16 substantive provisions); 
CRPD, supra note 364 (30 substantive provisions). 
373 See supra Section IV.E.1.a.3. 
374 See UN Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 20, arts. 36-56. 
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agencies and officials would be responsible for reporting on the most detailed provisions. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The time has come for the United States to take stock of the United Nations Convention on 
Migrant Worker Rights. The Convention is one of the United Nations’ nine major in-force 
human rights treaties, of which, to date, the United States has ratified four. The history of these 
previous ratifications supports U.S. ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention. Because of 
the United States’ extremely cautious human rights treaty ratification practice, and also because 
the Convention does not challenge U.S. immigration priorities, ratifying the Convention would 
be no threat to U.S. sovereignty. The substantive legal effects of such a move would likely be 
muted in the short- and medium- term. Moreover, the Convention takes no position on 
controversial immigration policies such as legalization, border enforcement and worksite raids. 
Instead, the Convention focuses on protecting migrant workers’ fundamental human rights and 
ensuring fundamental employment rights on an equal basis with other workers.  
 
Most of the concerns raised about the treaty when it was first promulgated have not been borne 
out in the intervening years and are not persuasive, but some concerns unique to this Convention 
do remain. The most important concern is that the treaty has a relatively low ratification rate to 
date, and it has not attracted ratification from any of the other industrialized countries of migrant 
employment. However, countries of employment are examining the Convention more actively 
than the United States, and an early ratification would be appropriate for a country that is 
perceived as having one of the world’s largest undocumented worker populations. Moreover, 
Europe already has a regional instrument on migrant worker rights, and the Americas do not; 
therefore, ratification of the international document is appropriate to fill a protection gap.  
 
The second valid concern about the Convention is that it is a good deal more detailed than the 
other UN human rights treaties, and therefore the initial work of assessing the treaty is more 
daunting.  However, the treaty focuses on a particular population and, to a large extent, one 
particular program, the U.S. temporary worker program. Therefore, monitoring the treaty will 
involve a relatively more discrete group of government actors and will not be burdensome once 
the initial work of assessment and the first round of reporting are complete.  
 
From the perspective of protecting one of this country’s most notoriously vulnerable populations, 
numerous other immediate benefits would accrue from the ratification debate and the monitoring 
process. By exposing more U.S. citizens to the notion that immigrant workers are the subject of a 
human rights treaty – even an ill subscribed treaty – engaging with the convention would help to 
shift the political climate toward policy reform. Ratification would also advance U.S. foreign 
policy goals by improving the United States’ reputation abroad, increasing its world leadership 
vis-à-vis the global south, improving the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and enabling the United 
States to shape the development of the emerging international law standards on immigrant 
workers. Working with the Convention would also assist the United States in identifying best 
practices and assist in badly needed cross-agency examination of this country’s fragmented 
temporary worker program. 
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The United States has developed the world’s largest per capita undocumented immigrant 
population, one of the world’s most deadly peacetime borders, and the most poverty-stricken 
low-income workforce in the industrialized world. Most agree, on humanitarian, labor, fiscal, 
international relations and security grounds, that this is a problem that needs to be addressed. 
Yet, except for policies of increased enforcement, domestic policy reforms proposals have failed 
politically. Signature and ratification of the Migrant Worker Convention would re-frame the 
debate on migrant labor and refocus attention on non-enforcement solutions to illegal 
immigration, allowing the United States to start on the path toward a rational global approach to 
low-paid labor migration. 
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Appendix I: U.S. Human Rights Treaty Signature and Ratification Pattern 
Last updated: August 15, 2008 
 
Topic of 
Treaty 
Name of 
Treaty 
Date 
promulgated 
(opened for 
signature)  
Date of 
U.S. 
Signature 
Date of 
U.S. 
Ratification 
Race ICERD 12/21/1965 9/28/1966 10/21/1994 
General civil 
and political 
rights 
ICCPR 12/16/1966 10/5/1977 6/8/1992 
General 
economic, 
social and 
cultural rights 
ICESCR 12/16/1966 10/5/1977 Not ratified 
by U.S. 
Refugees Refugee 
Protocol 
1/31/1967 
 
FIND 11/1/1968 
Gender CEDAW 3/1/1980 7/17/1980 Not ratified 
by U.S. 
Torture CAT 12/10/1984 4/18/1988 10/21/1994 
Children CRC 11/20/1989 2/16/1995 Not ratified 
by U.S. 
Death Penalty ICCPR 
Optional 
Protocol 2 
12/15/1989 Not 
signed by 
U.S. 
Not ratified 
by U.S. 
Migrant 
Workers 
ICMW 12/18/1990 Not 
signed by 
U.S. 
Not ratified 
by U.S. 
Children & 
Armed 
Combat 
CRC Op. 
Protocol I 
5/25/2000 7/5/2000 12/23/2002 
Children – 
Sale and 
Prostitution 
CRC Op. 
Protocol II 
5/25/2000 7/5/2000 12/23/2002 
Persons with 
Disabilities 
Convention 
on Persons 
with 
Disabilities 
12/13/2006 Not 
signed by 
U.S. 
Not ratified 
by U.S. 
Enforced 
Disappearance 
Convention 
Against 
Enforced 
Disappearance 
12/20/2006 Not 
signed by 
U.S. 
Not signed 
by U.S. 
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Appendix II: Treaty Ratification Timing by Top Ten Countries of Migrant Employment 
Last updated: March 20, 2009  
Treaty        
 
 
 
 
Country by  
rank in 
migrant 
employment 
ICERD  ICCPR  CAT 
 
 Average 
Days 
Between 
Promulgation 
and 
Ratification, 
by Country 
Date of 
Promulgation 
12/21/1965  12/16/1966  12/10/1984   
United States 
Ratification 
10/21/1994 10,532 10/21/1994 10,172 10/21/1994 3603 8102 
days/270 
months** 
Russia 
Ratification 
2/4/1969 1142 10/16/1973 2497 3/3/1987 814 1484 
Germany 
Ratification 
5/16/1969 1243 12/17/1973 2559 10/1/1990 2122 1975 
Ukraine 
Ratification 
3/7/1969 1173 11/12/1973 2524 2/24/1987 807 1501 
France 
Ratification 
7/28/1971 2046 11/4/1980 5073 2/18/1986 436 2638 
Saudi Arabia 
Ratification 
9/23/1977 4295 not signed 
not ratified 
calculated 
using 
3/20/2009 
15,436 9/23/1997 4671 8134 
Canada 
Ratification 
10/14/1970 1759 6/19/1976 3474 6/24/1987 927 2053 
India 
Ratification 
12/3/1968 1079 4/10/1979 4499 signed 
not ratified 
calculated 
using 
3/20/2009 
8867 4815 
UK 
Ratification 
3/7/1969 1173 5/20/1976 3444 10/8/1988 1399 2005 
Spain 
Ratification 
9/13/1968 998 4/27/1977 3786 10/21/1987 1046 1943 
Average 
Days 
Between 
Promulgation 
 2544  5346  2469 2937 
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and 
Ratification, 
by Treaty 
    Total 
Average 
3453 
days/115 
months** 
Average 
leaving 
out U.S. 
2936 days/98 
months** 
* Time elapsed calculations made using http://www.timeanddate.com/date/duration.html.  
** average “months” calculated by dividing days by 30 
